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Principles of modern taxation, aided and abetted by other economic
factors, have made it notoriously difficult for most individuals to set aside,
during their productive years, amounts sufficient to provide a decent stand-
ard of living once those years are past. Recognizing this problem, Congress,
as long ago as 1921,1 sought to provide relief by according favorable tax
treatment to those plans known generally as "deferred compensation" plans.
In essence, these plans consist of nothing more than employer contributions
which are set aside to be enjoyed by the employee or his beneficiaries at a
later time.2
Once such a plan has been "qualified" in accordance with the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations, valuable tax
benefits are available. The employee does not have to pay income tax on
such contributions (even though they are earned compensation) until such
time as he or his beneficiaries actually receive the distribution, or until it
becomes subject to his withdrawal.3 Nor will interest earnings of retirement
funds be taxed until withdrawn.4 Upon withdrawal of these funds, the em-
ployee will usually be taxed at ordinary income tax rates, 5 except in certain
situations where capital gains rates will apply." The employer is entitled to
an expense deduction for these contributions when made regardless of when
the employee actually receives the funds.7
1. For the background of federal taxation in this area, see PRENTICE HALL,
PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING § 5001 (1962).
2. The basic requirements for a qualified deferred compensation plan are set
out in § II of this article.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 4 02(a) (1), 403 (a) (1). [The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 is hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]
4. I.R.C., § 501(a).
5. I.R.C., § 61(a).
6. I.R.C., §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2).
7. I.R.C., § 404(a).
(161)
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The obvious benefit of such plans is that an employee can defer the tax
on some of the most heavily taxed portions of his income. Because of the
progressive tax schedule, deferring income taxation until a later time is
particularly beneficial to the highly paid employee, for such an employee is
usually in a higher tax bracket during his working years than after retire-
ment. Thus, when employer contributions are made during the high income
years, these contributions come off the top of current earnings and escape
the higher tax rate. When distribution of the retirement fund is made, the
recipient will usually be in a lower tax bracket, having no current earnings
or reduced earnings, and consequently the funds will be taxed at a lower rate
than they would have had been when set aside.8
The tax inequality in this area so often referred to was based upon the
fact that deferred compensation plans were not available to self-employed
individuals until the passage of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retire-
ment Act of 1962" In designating those persons for whose "exclusive benefit"
a plan could be established, the Code spoke solely in terms of "employees."''
Although it was (and perhaps still is) arguable that at least a partner, if not
a sole proprietor, should be considered an "employee," a series of contrary
rulings by the Commissioner" was apparently sufficient to dissuade the tax
bar from litigating the matter. Thus arose the normally accepted view that
partners and sole proprietors were not eligible to participate in a "qualified"
plan.
Qualified plans have long been available to employees of corporations,
and many businessmen have taken advantage of this by incorporating their
businesses and becoming corporate employees. For some, however, this
route to qualification was closed by the fact that most states prohibited in-
dividuals in the professional occupations from incorporating.2 Thus the self-
employed professional man often found himself at a severe disadvantage
tax-wise: he was not considered an "employee," and could not incorporate
to become one.
8. Of course, if the employee, due to wise investments, changes in rates, or
some other factor, is actually in a higher tax bracket in his later years and after
retirement, any tax benefits from deferring compensation may be eradicated.
9. Public Law 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962).
10. I.R.C., § 401(a).
11. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 128, part 2(i)(1): Rev. Rul. 33,
1953-1 Cum. Bull. 287, part 2(b)(1); I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 64; I.T. 3268,
1939-1 Cum. Bull. 196.
12. The status of professional incorporation today is discussed in § III
B of this article.
[Vol. 28
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Illustrative of this inequality is the example which one author 3 uses to
indicate the money-saving aspect of a qualified pension or profit-sharing
plan. Assume that a 35 year old, married, practicing lawyer or other self-
employed person has a taxable income of $10,000 after deductions. If he
were to earn an additional $1,000, his tax on the additional amount would
be $260. If he invests the remainder, $740, each year for thirty years at a
4% compound interest rate he would accumulate a total of $36,900 by age
sixty-five. However, if he were employed by a company, and his employer
deposited the same $1,000 for him in a qualified pension or profit-sharing
plan, at the same 4% interest rate, the fund would total $58,300 at age
sixty-five.
As a result of this unequal treatment, requests for income tax deferral
have long been voiced by the self-employed. In deference to such a request,
it should be noted that the self-employed individual is not seeking prefer-
ential treatment; he only wants equality. The self-employed feel, as evi-
denced by their long and untiring efforts to secure additional legislation, 4
that they too should be allowed tax benefits in providing for retirement. The
professional man emphasizes such factors as his late start due to educational
requirements, the early lean years of practice, his high earnings over a rela-
tively short period, and the eventual tapering off of his earning capacity. For
example, prior to 1962, a forty year old, self-employed man with a wife and
two children, in order to retire at age sixty-five at about thirty-six percent
of his present $10,000 income, had to expend approximately $51,000. On the
other hand, an employer needed to contribute only approximately $19,000
13. Donohue, Smathers-Keogh-Simpson Legislation: Retirement Savings for
the Self-Employed, 45 A.B.AJ. 795 (1959).
14. For a history of the movement for additional legislation, see Hamblen,
A Precis of Deferred Compensation Arrangements, 4 PRAcricAL LAWYER 58 (Nov.
1958); Hoffman, Tax Planning in Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Plans, 5
TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 189 (1961); Lurie, How to Achieve Flexibility in Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans, 8 J. TAXATION 236 (1958); Paulston, Professionat Partnerships
Taxable as Corporations, 35 L.A. B. BuLL. 121 (1960); Rapp, Pensions for the
Self-Employed: The Treasury Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAX
L. Rzv. 227 (1961); Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans:
A Short History of the Jenkins-Koegt Bill, 14 TAX L. REv. 55 (1958); Silverson,
Earned Income and Ability to Pay, 3 TAX L. REv. 299 (1947); Stutsman, How to
Organize Professional Men for Corporate Tax Status Under Kintner, 11 J. TAXATION
336 (1959); Stutsman, New Kintner Regulations Not Retroactive; Give Specific
Critera to Test Partnership, 12 J. TAXATION 174 (1960); Winkleman, Pension and
Other Deferred Compensation for the Professional Man, 4 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q.
155 (1960); Zischke, The Use of Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Plans for the
Benefit of Small Businesses and Their Owners, 1961 TUL. TAX INST. 526; 34 FLA.
B.J. 197 (1960); 12 W. REs. L. REv. 777 (1961).
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over the same period in order to achieve the same retirement benefits for a
similarly situated employee under a qualified pension plan.
In all fairness to Congress, on the other hand, it must be noted that the
tax benefit which was conferred upon those covered under private pension
plans was not the result of any legislative purpose to discriminate in favor
of one group. It was based upon simple equity, to prevent employees from
having to pay present income tax on funds put aside for them by their em-
ployers which would not become available until some years in the future,
and possibly not at all, if they died or terminated their employment prior to
acquiring a vested interest in the fund. Furthermore, in support of its former
position the government pointed out that there would be a substantial reve-
nue loss if it did not get its maximum share during the self-employed's high-
earning years. To the self-employed, of course, this argument seemed to ig-
nore the equities, since the government was treating corporate employees,
with similar education, skills and duties, in exactly the opposite manner.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand fully the ramifications of the area under discus-
sion, it is helpful if one first understands the general background of deferred
compensation taxation. For the same reason, a short discussion of the vari-
ous types of deferred compensation plans, and their advantages and disad-
vantages to employers and employees, seems in order.
Generally speaking, deferred compensation plans are of three basic
types: (1) pension plans, (2) profit sharing plans, and (3) stock bonus
plans. In actuality, however, the primary point of distinction is between
pension plans and profit sharing plans; the stock bonus plan is simply a type
of profit sharing plan in which the benefits are distributable in the stock of
the employer company.
The Code reference to the distinction between pension and profit shar-
ing plans is the statement found in section 404 (a) (3), that a plan is not a
profit sharing or stock option plan if the amounts to be contributed can be
actuarily determined. Enlarging upon this, the Regulations provide that a
pension plan is one "established and maintained by an employer primarily
to provide systematically for the payment of definitely determinable bene-
fits to his employees over a period of years, usually for life, after retire-
ment."1'5 It would seem, then, that the distinction could be phrased as one
between ends and means, with the emphasis, in the case of a pension plan,
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)(1) (1958).
[Vol. 28
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being placed upon the ends. With a pension plan the first determination is
of the amount of benefits-the ends-eventually to be received by the em-
ployee. Once this has been determined, the contributions necessary-the
means-may be determined upon the basis of actuarial computations rela-
tive to the employee's expected life span after retirement, etc 8 A profit
sharing plan, on the other hand, places its primary emphasis upon the means.
Contributions to the plan are geared to whether or not a sufficient profit is
shown for each particular year, and the benefits ultimately realized, instead
of being "definitely determinable," will depend upon the employer's profits
for the particular years.1 7
Quite obviously, the heart and soul of a "qualified" plan of the above
types will be found in its method for providing the funds later to be dis-
tributed. While the methods of accomplishing this are almost as numerous
as the plans themselves, a generalized listing would include: (1) group in-
surance annuities, (2) individual insurance annuities, (3) uninsured plans
administered through a trust, and (4) combination plans. A trust, however,
may be utilized even if the plan is one that might be termed "insured"; the
trustee, rather than the employer, will take charge of the contributions and
invest them in annuities. Needless to say, the subject is an extremely sophis-
ticated one, and an employer's choice of funding methods will depend upon
a host of factors.'8 Methods of funding particularly applicable to the self-
employed person will be considered in a later section of this article."9
A qualified pension plan has the advantage of providing the beneficiary
with definite, known benefits, actuarily determined, to be paid in full upon
retirement, or, in the alternative, definite contributions toward a fund which
will furnish the beneficiary periodic benefits upon retirement. Since the size
of the contribution to be made is not determined by the extent of the em-
ployer's profits, there is an advantage to the beneficiaries in that ordinarily
they will know the size of the projected retirement benefit while they are
working, and can plan accordingly. For these and cognate reasons most
large businesses have some form of pension plan.
The major disadvantage to a pension plan is from the employer's point
of view-he may not want to be obligated to make contributions to a plan
in years when he has suffered an operating loss or made only a small profit.
The alternative solution is to set up a qualified profit-sharing plan, where
16. See PRENTICE HALL, PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING § 5019 (1962).
17. Ibid.
18. See generally id. §§ 1511-1766.
19. See infra notes 238-55 and accompanying text.
19631
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contributions are made only when the employer has a profit for the taxable
years. Conversely, the disadvantage of a profit-sharing plan is often from
the employee's point of view-because contributions are dependent upon
profits, the ultimate available benefits cannot be determined in advance of
retirement. In addition, the size of the benefits may or may not be as large
as those available under a pension plan. For these reasons the profit sharing
plan has obvious attractions for the small closely held business.
As previously stated, contributions to a qualified plan bring forth a va-
riety of tax benefits. The employer is permitted an immediate deduction for
his contributions to the qualified plan within the limits of the Code."" The
limit of contributions to a qualified pension plan is 5% of compensation paid
to covered employees, plus the sum necessary to cover past and current ser-
vice costs determined actuarily, or the normal cost of the plan determined
under Treasury Regulations plus 10% of past service costs. For contribu-
tions to a profit-sharing plan, an amount not in excess of 15% of the com-
pensation paid to covered employees may be deducted by the employer. It
two or more qualified plans provide benefits for the same group of employees,
an overall limit of 25% of compensation paid is placed upon the allowable
deduction. The employee pays no income tax on contributions for his bene-
fit until he receives distributions under the plan.21 The income from a trust
set up under a qualified plan enjoys a tax exempt status during the trust's
duration.22
If the employee receives a lump sum distribution upon retirement, the
amount is given capital gains treatment.2 3 Distributions from a qualified
plan may also qualify for a $5,000 death benefit income tax exclusion,24 and
an estate and gift tax exemtion. 25 The plan may provide for a postponement
of vesting until retirement, provided that this does not produce prohibited
discrimination, but vesting of benefits is required upon termination of the
plan.26
To qualify for the tax favored status a plan must be for the exclusive
benefit of "employees, ' 27 be in writing,28 meet certain tests on coverage of
20. I.R.C., § 404 defines the limits on contributions by an employer to a quali-
fied plan.
21. I.R.C., § 72(d)(1).
22. I.R.C., § 501(a).
23. I.R.C., § 402(a)(2).
24. I.R.C., § 101(b)(2).
25. I.R.C., §§ 2039(c), 2517(a).
26. I.R.C., § 401(a) (7). Added in 1962, see infra. note 236.
27. I.R.C., § 401(a).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.4 0 1-1(a)(2) (1958).
[Vol. 28
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eligible employees, 2 and not discriminate in favor of officers, stockholders,
supervisors, or highly compensated employees.30 It is not required, however,
that all employees be covered; the plan may be limited to salaried or clerical
employees.- In the case of qualified pension or profit sharing plans, a carry
forward of excess contributions made currently is provided to permit their
deduction in future taxable years.32 A definite formula requirement for con-
tributions to be made under a qualified profit-sharing plan was dropped by
the Treasury Department in 195633 after it lost several cases on the point.3 4
Certain transactions between the employer and a qualified-plan trust
are regulated by the Code. The employer can borrow money from the trust
only when adequate security and a reasonable rate of return are provided.'5
Likewise, he may buy from or sell property to the trust only for adequate
consideration. Finally, any fee charge for services rendered to the trust by
the employer must be reasonable.3 7
These, then, are the basic outlines of the deferred compensation chap-
ters of the pre-1962 Internal Revenue Code. The problem for the self-em-
ployed individual was simply of finding a way by which he might avail him-
self of such plans.
III. PROBLEMS WiT "INDIRECT" METHODS OF ESTABLISHING EQUALITY
A. Morrissey-Kintner Type Professional Association
As could be expected, the self-employed group soon set about to find
methods of qualifying under the Internal Revenue Code. To accomplish this,
at least without the aid of direct Congressional action, it was necessary to
achieve the status of an "employee." As previously mentioned, the difficul-
ties involved here were that partners were not considered "employees" of a
partnership,38 and that most states prohibited professional people from in-
corporating.
29. I.R.C., §§ 401(a) (3) (A), (B).
30. I.R.C., § 401(a) (4).
31. I.R.C., § 401(a) (5).
32. I.R.C., §§ 404(a) (1) (D), (3)(A).
33. T.D. 6189, 56 Cum. Bull. 972 (1956).
34. McClintock-Turnkey Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954);
Produce Reporter Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F. 586 (7th Cir. 1953); Lincoln Elec.
Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951); E. R. Wagner Mfg. Co., 18
T.C. 657 (1952).
35. I.R.C., § 503 (c)(1).
36. I.R.C., §§ 503(c) (4), (5).
37. I.R.C., § 503 (c) (2).
38. Revenue Rulings cited note 11 supra.
1963]
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The first open door was found in the Internal Revenue Code's definition
of those organizations which were to be taxed as a corporation. The Code
states that "the term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock com-
panies, and insurance companies."3 9 The term "association" itself is not
defined in the Code. The same Code section says that "the term 'partnership'
includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
organization ... which is not ... a trust or estate or corporation." 40
Prior to 1935, the Commissioner contended, in construing this section,
that a business organization possessing characteristics of a corporation,
which in fact was not incorporated, should be considered an association
(and hence taxed as a corporation) even though it would be a partnership
or trust under the applicable state law. In 1935 the Supreme Court accepted
this contention in the Morrissey case, 41 and held that the "trust" which
was organized and operated for the purpose of subdividing and selling real
estate was taxable as a corporation. The Court pointed out that this par-
ticular "trust" had more of the attributes of a corporation than of an ordi-
nary trust, e.g., associates, carrying on of a business, centralized control,
limited liability, continuity of life, and transferability of interests.
In the now famous Kintner case,42 the taxpayer and a group of doc-
tors, with Morrissey and several subsequent cases in mind, and knowing
that a corporation could not be formed for the practice of medicine in the
State of Montana, organized the Western Montana Clinic Association. It
was their intent that the Association, without actually being incorporated,
should have to the extent permissible by law all the attributes of a corpora-
tion, and should be treated as a corporation for federal tax purposes. With
this foundation, it was contended that the Association's retirement plan
qualified under the Code. The Commissioner, characteristically, took the
opposite viewpoint.
In addition to other features, the Association possessed the following
attributes: (1) all of the members were to be employed by the Association
despite their ownership of beneficial interests in the Association; (2) the
Association employed the services of certain non-member doctors; (3) the
Association acquired all of the assets and liabilities of the former partner-
39. I.R.C., § 7701(a) (3).
40. I.R.C., § 7701(a) (2).
41. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). See also Pelton v. Com-
missioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
42. Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952), aff'd, 216
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). For a similar more recent case, see Galt v. United States,
175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
[Vol. 28
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ship; (4) all of the property was held in the name of the Association; (5)
a centralized management was established; (6) the Association was to
continue until the death of the last of the original members; (7) the benefi-
cial interest of the members had limited transferability; and (8) only the
individual member was to be held liable to third parties for professional
misconduct.
After studying the definitions of "associations" and "partnerships" set
forth in the Treasury Regulations, the Federal District Court for the
District of Montana concluded that the Western Montana Clinic Associa-
tion was indeed an "association," taxable as a corporation. The court then
summarized the features, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the
Morrissey case, that were characteristic of corporations:
1. A corporation, as an entity, holds the title to the property em-
barked in the corporate undertaking.
2. Corporate organization furnishes the opportunity for a central-
ized management through representatives of the members of the
corporation.
3. The enterprise is secure from termination or interruption by the
death or withdrawal of owners of participating interests.
4. Corporate organization facilitates the transfer of beneficial in-
terests without affecting the continuity of enterprise.
5. The corporation organization permits the limitation of per-
sonal liability of participants to the property embarked in the
undertaking.43
The court also interpreted Morrissey and subsequent court of appeals
cases interpreting Morrissey as holding that an organization need not
meet all five of the above suggested tests, but rather that the organiza-
tion must be closely examined to ascertain whether it more closely re-
sembles a corporation than a partnership, and its status is to be determined
by the "balance of resemblance." The Association in question was found
to meet the first, second and third of the above tests. With respect to test
four, while the Association did not fully resemble a corporation, neither did
it resemble a partnership. As to test five, it was held that the Association
more closely resembled a partnership than a corporation. Thus, as between
a corporation and a partnership, the Association was held to resemble more
closely a corporation. Since, generally speaking, a partnership does not
survive the death or withdrawal of a member, test three was the most
43. 107 F. Supp. at 979.
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decisive in the eyes of the court. It should be noted that this represents
something of a qualitative rather than a strict quantitative approach.
The issue as to whether the taxpayer was an "employee" of the Asso-
ciation was resolved in his favor. The court pointed out that the doctor's
time was commanded by the Association; that he was paid by the Associa-
tion rather than by the patients; that his office hours and vacations were
dictated by the Association; and that he could be discharged from member-
ship in and employment by the Association. The court thus held that the
pension plan involved qualified under the appropriate provision of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
The district court decision was affirmed on appeal," although it is dif-
ficult to determine whether the court of appeals based its decision upon
exactly the same criteria. The lower court seemed particularly impressed
by the fact that the existence of the Association was not terminated or
interrupted by the death or withdrawal of members. The court of appeals
specifically mentioned that the district court had placed considerable em-
phasis on this fact, but added no approving or disapproving comment of
its own. The fact that such mention was made without disapproval, however,
would seem to indicate a general approval. If so, then the "qualitative" test
would seem to be the prevailing case-law.
The Government argued that since physicians could not incorporate
under Montana law, the Association could not be treated as a corporation
for federal tax purposes. The court of appeals rejected this argument, and
held that since the Association had more of the criteria of a corporation
than a partnership the state classification could be disregarded for federal
taxation purposes.
The Revenue Service at first elected not to follow the decision, and
ruled that doctors who organize an association in order to establish a
qualified pension and profit-sharing plan would be treated as partners.45
However, a later Revenue Ruling held that such an organization could
constitute an association, and hence qualify its pension and profit-sharing
plans, if it possessed the necessary attributes."6 What the necessary attributes
were was not stated; regulations on the matter were to be published at
44. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
45. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 598.
46. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886.
[Vol. 28
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a later date. These Regulations-the so-called "Kintner" Regulations-were
subsequently issued on November 15, 1960 7
1. Governing Law
The first significant matter covered by the "Kintner" Regulations is
the effect of local law upon classification of organizations for federal tax
purposes. The former regulations48 provided that for the purpose of federal
taxation the Internal Revenue Code made its own classification and
prescribed its own standards of classification, and that local law was of no
importance in this determination. The new Regulations,49 on the other
hand, provide that although the Internal Revenue Code rather than local
law will govern the tests or standards which will be applied in determining
the classification of an organization, local law will govern in determining
whether the legal relationships which have been established are such that
the Code's standards are met.
2. Associations Characterized
The "Kintner" Regulations provide that the term "association" refers
to an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified for tax
purposes as a corporation rather than as another type of business organiza-
tion.50 To define the matter further, there is provided a list of major char-
acteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation, which, taken together,
distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (1) associates, (2) an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (3) con-
tinunity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability for corporate
debts limited to corporate property, and (6) free transferability of in-
terests. All of the characteristics listed must be taken into account when
classifying an organization. An organization will be treated as an associa-
tion if the corporate characteristics are such that the organization more
clearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust.
The resulting problem is in determining whether a particular organiza-
tion more clearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust. The
Regulations take the position that an unincorporated organization shall
47. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960). For a general discussion of these
requirements see Zarky, Unincorporated Organizations Taxable as Corporations,
1961 So. CAL. TAx INsT. 277; 75 HARv. L. Ray. 776 (1962).
48. Treas. Reg. § 39.3797-1 (1955).
49. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
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not be classified as an association unless such organization has more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate ones." However, in determining
whether an organization has more corporate characteristics than non-
corporate ones, those characteristics that are common to corporations,
trusts and partnerships shall not be considered.52 For example, since (1)
associates, and (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom, are characteristics generally common to both corporations and
partnerships, they will be excluded from consideration when determining
whether an organization which has such characteristics is to be treated for
tax purposes as a partnership or an association. Hence, the presence or ab-
sence of a majority of the four remaining corporate characteristics-(3)
continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) limited liability,
and (6) free transferability of interests-will be controlling.' 3 For this rea-
son, these four characteristics will be accorded extended treatment in follow-
ing sections.
It appears that the Regulations have taken a quantitative rather than
a qualitative approach in determining whether an organization is an associa-
tion.'" No specific weight is given to any one of the characteristics set forth
by the Regulations; the mere presence or absence of a majority is apparent-
ly to be conclusive. On the other hand, in the Kintner case the district
court and arguably the court of appeals gave additional weight to continuity
of life. As of this date, there is no case resolving the apparent inconsistency
between the case law and the Regulations.
3. Continuity of Life
The Regulations provide that an organization will not have continuity
of life for federal taxation purposes if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, re-
tirement, resignation or expulsion of any member will cause a dissolution of
the organization." Also, if the retirement, death or insanity of a general
partner in a limited partnership results in dissolution, continuity of life
does not exist unless the remaining general partners agree to continue the
partnership.
It should be noted that "continuity of life" is somewhat less than a
meaningful term for purposes of this discussion. The fact that an organiza-
51. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
52. Ibid.
53. Examples of the application of these rules may be found in Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(g) (1960).
54. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960).
55. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
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tion continues after the death of a member will not of itself meet the re-
quirement of the Regulations. The Regulations find "continuity of life"
only where there is an absence of dissolution."6 A more appropriate char-
acterization would have been the requirement of "non-dissolution." The
Regulations provide that the dissolution of an organization means an altera-
tion of the identity of an organization by reason of a change in the rela-
tionship between its members as determined under local law.57 For example,
a partnership agreement may provide that the business will be continued
by the remaining members after the death or withdrawal of any member,
but such an agreement does not establish continuity of life if under local
law the death or withdrawal of any member causes a dissolution of the or-
ganization. Thus, there may be a dissolution of the organization and no
continuity of life under local law and consequently for purposes of federal
taxation, even though the business is continued by the remaining partners.,;
The Regulations do take into consideration an agreement providing
that the organization is to continue for a stated period or until the com-
pletion of a stated undertaking, in determining status for tax purposes.59
Continuity of life does not exist, however, if such an agreement provides
for termination of the organization at will or otherwise.
A rather serious question presents itself at this point. What will be the
effect of local statutes which give each member of the organization a power
to terminate regardless of his prior agreement, or which provide for dis-
solution upon the happening of certain events. The Regulations clearly
answer this question by providing that if, notwithstanding a prior agree-
ment, any member has the power under local law to dissolve the organiza-
tion, the organization lacks continuity of life.60 Consequently, a general
partnership formed under a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partner-
ship Act 6' and a limited partnership created under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act 62 both lack continuity of life.
Again the position taken by the Regulations appears to be contrary to
that taken in the Kintner case. Montana adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act in 1947,11 before the Western Montana Clinic Association was formed.
It appears that the Association was a partnership under Montana law.
56. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (2) (1960).
57. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1960).
58. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (3) (1960).
60. Ibid.
61. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 31, 32.
62. UNIFORM LInITE PARTNERSHIP Acr § 9(1).
63. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §H 63-101 to -515 (1947).
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Nevertheless, the court which decided the Kintner case in 1952 found con-
tinuity of life existing because of the contractual arrangement among the
partners allowing the organization to continue notwithstanding death or re-
tirement of any of them. Hence, under the "Kintner" Regulations, the
Western Montana Clinic Association would lack continuity of life-a rather
anomalous situation.
4. Centralization of Management
As distinguished from a partnership, the management of a corporation
is usually vested in a board of directors or some similar body. In general,
all members of a partnership, by the nature of the organization, have an
interest in the management of the business (providing there is no contrary
agreement) 4 The Regulations provide that an organization has a central-
ized management if any person or any group of persons which does not in-
clude all the members has continuing exclusive authority to make the man-
agement decisions necessary for conduct of the business for which the or-
ganization was formed.0 ' The Regulations further provide that the persons
who have such authority may, or may not, be members of the organization,
and may hold office as a result of a selection by the members from time
to time, or may be self-perpetuating in office. 6 However, there is no
centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to per-
form ministerial acts as an agent under the direction of a principal.67
The Regulations rule that a general partnership, subject to a statute
corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act, cannot achieve effective
concentration of management powers, and, therefore, centralized manage-
ment."' The basis of this ruling is the mutual agency relationship that exists
between members of a general partnership created under the Uniform
Partnership Act or a similar act. 9 Again, note the existence of a distinction
that was not made in the Kintner case. Normally, of course, limited partner-
ships created under a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act"0 do not have centralized management. But, if substantially all
the interests in the limited partnership are owned by the limited partners,
centralized management ordinarily does exist.
64. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Aar § 18(e).
65. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960).
66. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (1960).
67. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701- 2 (c)( 3 ) (1960).
68. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1960).
69. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1).
70. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1).
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5. Limited Liability
Under the "Kintner" Regulations, an organization is deemed to have
the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under local law there is
no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against the
organization.- It is permissible for a member of an organization to make
an agreement whereby another person, whether or not a member of the or-
ganization, assumes such liability or agrees to indemnify such member for
his liability. However, if under local law the member remains liable to the
organization's creditors, he is deemed to have personal liability. Consequent-
ly, personal liability exists with respect to each general partner of a general
partnership under a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act.7 2
Likewise, in the case of a limited partnership under statute corresponding
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,73 personal liability exists with
respect to each general partner except (1) with respect to each general
partner when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the
partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of the organization, and
(2) when he is merely a "dummy" acting as agent for the limited partners,
in which case personal liability will exist with respect to such limited
partners regardless of the limited partnership.7 4
6. Free Transferability of Interests
The Regulations deem an organization to have the corporate character-
istic of free transferability of interests if each of its members or those mem-
bers owning substantially all of the interests in the organization can, with-
out the consent of other members, substitute for themselves in the organiza-
tion a person who was previously not a member of the organization .7 For
this power of substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must
be able, without the consent of other members, to confer upon his suc-
cessor all the attributes of his interest in the organization. Thus, even
though an agreement provides otherwise, there is no power of substitution
and no free transferability of interset for tax purposes if under local law
the transfer of a member's interest results in the dissolution of the old
organization and the formation of a new one. Statutes corresponding to the
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).
72. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15.
73. UNIFORM LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP ACr § 9(1).
74. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(d) (1), (2) (1960).
75. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
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Uniform Partnership Acte, provide that the conveyance by a partner of
his interest in the partnership does not of itself, in the absence of an agree-
ment, entitle the assignee, during the continuance of the partnership, to
participate in the management or administration of the partnership busi-
ness or affairs. Nor may any person become a member of a partnership
without the consent of all the partners.77 Accordingly, an organization
created under such a statute would clearly seem to violate the Regulation's
requirement.7T On the other hand, the interest of a limited partner, under
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, is clearly assignable.79 Consequently,
if the limited partners own substantially all of the interests of the limited
partnership, free transferability of interests will be deemed to exist.
The Regulations do recognize a modified form of free transferability of
interest80 This is deemed to exist when there is an agreement allowing a
member to transfer his interest to an outsider after the other members have
refused to purchase the interest at fair market value. However, in deter-
mining classifications of organizations, this modified characteristic will be
accorded less significance than if such characteristic were present in an
unmodified form.8'
7. Illustrations
The Regulations contain several illustrations wherein the basic criteria
are applied to hypothetical organizations. Reference to these is helpful in
understanding the requirements for a qualified plan. One such example is
as follows:
A group of twenty-five persons forms an organization for the
purpose of engaging in real estate investment activities. Under their
agreement, the organization is to have a life of twenty years, and
under the applicable local law, no member has the power to dis-
solve the organization prior to the expiration of that period. The
management of the organization is vested exclusively in an execu-
tive committee of five members elected by all the members, and
under the applicable local law, no one acting without the authority
of the committee has the power to bind the organization by his
acts. Under the applicable local law, each member is personally
liable for the obligations of the organization. Every member has
76. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 27(1).
77. UNIxORM PARTNERSHIP Ac T 18(g).
78. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (1960).
79. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACr § 19(1).
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the right to transfer his interest to a person who is not a member
of the organization, but he must first advise the organization of the
proposed transfer and give it the opportunity on a vote of the
majority to purchase the interest at its fair market value. The
organization has associates and an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains therefrom. While the organization does not
'have the corporate characteristic of limited liability, it does have
continuity of life, centralized management, and a modified form of
free transferability of interests. The organization will be classified
as an association for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.8 2
It would appear from the foregoing that, in the absence of specific
legislation, any organization otherwise governed by the Uniform Partnership
Act could not possibly qualify as an "association." The fact that a majority
of the states8 have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act would thus seem
to make the Kintner-type association a rather rocky path to the benefits
of a qualified deferred compensation plan.
The brighter side of the picture is the possibility that the courts may
refuse to follow the Regulations. The court which decided the Kinttter
case had no difficulty in ascribing "association" status to the Western Mon-
tana Clinic Association. As was pointed out earlier, the Western Montana
Clinic Association would probably not meet the requirements of the
"Kintner" Regulations. If and when such a case does reach the Supreme
Court, the Court may well decide that the view adopted by the court in
the Kintner case is the correct interpretation of the Code. Another bright
spot is the recent announcement that the Commissioner is considering
amending the "Kintner" Regulations.
Even if the Kintner case is followed, however, it is questionable as to
how beneficial this type of "association" will be in some of the other
professions. For example, the legal profession may not be readily adaptable
to the clinic-type organization, because of the highly personal nature of
the attorney-client relationship. It is true, of course, that others may yet
devise an organization pattern that will qualify under the case-law or Regu-
lations and still prove suitable for other types of professions.8 " On the whole,
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7 70 1-2 (g)(5) (1960).
83. As of the date of this printing, forty states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. Missouri is among those states. See
c. 358, RSMo 1959.
84. The foregoing discussion is based upon the Treasury Regulations as they
now stand. If the Commissioner alters them with the passage of H.R. 10, this area
will have to be re-examined in light of those changes.
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however, for many professionals there may be no alternative other than
actual incorporation-a matter of no little complexity and difficulty in and
of itself.
B. Professional Corporations
1. The Need for Professional Incorporation
The "Kintner" Regulations, quite obviously, have made the profes-
sional "association" scheme a rather questionable way of attempting to
achieve deferred compensation tax benefits. Even though a court might in-
deed hold the Regulations invalid, most professionals are unwilling to risk
such a contingency. In view of that fact, and in view of the fact that H.R.
10 (to be considered in a later section of this article) is of somewhat dubious
value, many professional men, including those who have made it their busi-
ness to devote careful study to this field, still consider that professional
corporations are badly needed to remedy the inequality that now exists
with regard to deferred compensation taxation.
The pressure upon states to allow professional corporations began
shortly after the promulgation of the "Kintner" Regulations. The problem
was somewhat analogous to that in which the states found themselves sev-
eral years ago with regard to community property, before Congress enacted
the income, gift, and estate-splitting provisions of the present Internal
Revenue Code. The argument made by professionals, similar in theory to
that advanced as to community property, was that if states did not change
their laws to allow professional corporations, they would deny to their
citizens tax advantages available in other states which did allow professional
men to incorporate.
The result has been an unwilling swing toward allowing members of
certain professional groups to incorporate or qualify as an association.8 5
85. For general background material see Panel: Professional Associations, 101
TRUSTS & ESTATES 886 (1962); Panel: Professional Associations: Substance, Ethics,
and Taxation, 1962 A.B.A. SEcT. REAL PROP. L. 25 (1962); Symposium: Professional
Associations, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 195 (1962); Baker and Hudson, Professional
Association-A New Legal Entity, 23 ALA. LAw. 134 (1962); Beinfield, Advantages
and Factors in Forming a Professional Association, 50 ILL. B. J. 904 (1962); Bittker,
Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Com-
ments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961); Buchmann & Bearden, Professional Service
Corporations-A New Business Entity, 16 U. Mi~awi L. REV. 1 (1961); Bye &
Young, Law Firm Incorporation in Colorado, 34 RocKY MT. L. REV. 427 (1962);
Dunkel, Professional Corporations, 22 OHIo ST. L. J. 703 (1961); Eber, Profes-
sional Service Corporations-The Answer to the Kintner-type Organization, 100
TRUSTS & ESTATES 758 (1961); Eber, Pros and Cons of the New Professional Serv-
ice Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 308 (1961); Fleig, Professional Corporations, 33
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By 1962, fourteen states had adopted various types of acts allowing pro-
fessional associations or corporations. Others are accomplishing the same
OKLA. B.A.J. 357 (1962); Freutel & Frost, Why Lawyers Should Have the Right
to Practice in Corporate Form, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 874 (1962); Frost, Some Comments
as to Professional Corporation Statutes, 4 ARiz. L. REV. 169 (1963); Grayck, Tax
Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional Practitioners: A Comparison of the
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 and the Professional Asso-
ciation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1963); Grayck, Professional Associations and the
Kintner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further Comment, 17
TAX L. REV. 469 (1962); Haynes, Professional Association Pension Plans, 5 So.
TEX. L.J. 354 (1961); Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate?, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 150
(1959); Jones, Professional Corporation, 27 FORD L. REV. 353 (1958); Lyon,
Corporate Practice of Law-Problems and Advantages, 3 L. OFF. EcoN. & MAN.
21 (1962); Lyons, Comments on the New Regulations on Associations, 16 TAX L.
REV. 441 (1961); 26 ALBANY L. REV. 246 (1962); Mackey, Professional Associations
Instead of Partnerships, 107 TUL. TAX INsT. 409 (1961); Maier & Wild, Taxation
of Professional Firms as Corporations, 44 MARQ,. L. REV. 127 (1960); Maier, Pro-
fessional Corporations and the Kintner Association Advancing: Box Score to Date,
17 J. TAXATION 2 (1962); Maier, Don't Confuse Kintner-type Associations with.
New Professional Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 248 (1961); Marcus, Why Lawyers
Should Not Be Permitted to Practice in Corporate Form, 37 CALIF. S.B.J." 89&'
(1962); Mow, Professional Associations and Professional Corporations, 16 Sw. L.J.
462 (1962); Nolan, Tumult in the Industry-Corporate Tax Status for the Profes-
sional, 14 J. AM. Soc. C.L.U. 217 (1960); Ohl, Corporate Tax Status for Lawyers,
33 N.Y.S.B.J. 165 (1961); Porter, Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corpora-
tions, 30 J.B.A. KAN. 235 (1962); Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical
Clinics Organized as Associations, 39 TAXES 73 (1961); Sarner, Associations Taxa-
ble as Corporations: A Review and a Look Ahead, 20 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAXATIbN
609 (1962); Specter, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Coverage and Operation for
Closely Held Corporations and Professional Association, 7 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1962);
Stavole, Corporate Employee Tax Status for the Professional Man, 11 CLEV. MAR.
L. REV. 176 (1962); Stutsman, How to Transfer a Professional Partnership into a
Kintner Association, 11 J. TAXATION 336 (1959); Waisel, Tax Aspects of a Profes-
sional Association, 3 L. OFF. ECON. & MAN. 137 (1962); White & Peterson,
Corporate Tax Advantages for Attorneys, 35 CALIF. S.B.J. 167 (1960); Williams
& Cowart, Federal Income Tax Advantages for Professionals-The Georgia Profes-
sional Association Act, 12 MERCER L. REV. 388 (1961); Wilson, Professional Asso-
ciations Taxable as Corporations, 5 TEx. INST. 1 (1961); Wolper, Medical Entities
Taxed as Corporations: A New Field, 15 J. AM. Soc. C.L.U. 353 (1961); 1 B.C.
INC. & COM. L.R. 260 (1960); 107 B.U. L. REV. 43 (1963); 36 FLA. B.J. 16 (1962);
75 HIARv. L. REV. 776 (1962); 37 Ind. L. J. 124, 138 (1961); 47 MAss. L. Q. 405(1962); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545 (1962); 34 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 372 (1960); 35
TEmp. L.J. 312 (1962); 29 TENN. L. REV. 437 (1962); 31 U. CINc. L. REV. 341
(1962); 64 W. VA. L. REV. 310 (1962). For treatments of particular statutes, see,
among others, Bye & Young, supra; Horsley, Virginia Professional Association Act:
Relief for the Underprivileged?, 48 VA. L. REV. 777 (1962); Kahn, The Wisconsin
Service Corporation Law of 1961, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 65 (1962); Linquist & Mul-
hem, Professional Association in Illinois: Fringe Benefits for Members of the Pro-
fessions, 50 ILL. B.J. 98 (1961); Maier, Use of the New Wisconsin Service Corpora-
tion Law, 22 GAVEL 11 (1962); Morrison, The Proposed Professional Corporation
Law of Missouri, 19 J. Mo. BAR 228 (1963); Ohl, Corporate Practice of Law in
New York, 40 TAXES 263 (1962); Thrower and Cohen, Professional Associations
under Georgia Act-Some Tax Aspects and Considerations of Legal Ethics, 24 GA.
B.J. 163 (1961); Williams & Cowart, supra; Williams, Medical and Dental Corpora-
tions: A Step Towards Tax Equality, 15 ARK. L. REV. 366 (1962); 14 ALA. L. REV.
79 (1961); 31 U. CINc. L. REv. 71 (1962); 37 Nw. L. REV. 334 (1962).
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result, at least as to lawyers, by court rule.87 Even the American Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on Professional Ethics has given its endorsement, al-
though not without reservation8s
Seven states authorize professional "corporations" which are to be
governed under the state's general business corporation statutes except for
some restrictions imposed with regard to a professional "corporation's" spe-
cial character," Eight states have attempted to confer corporate char-
acteristics either by creating a new entity termed an "Association" for
rendering professional services, or by amending their partnership law to
enable members of professional firms to make private agreements adopting
corporate characteristics."0 One of these states calls such an organization
both a "corporation" and an "association." 9 ' At least two state Supreme
Courts have given their approval to such statutes as regards attorneys;
9 2
one has in effect ruled the statute inapplicable to attorneys, regardless of
legislative intent.9 3
Because enabling statutes and court rules are drafted to meet ethical
objections to professional incorporation, and to assure that individual pro-
fessional shareholders will still be subject to professional discipline, the
professional corporation will be a rara avis in the corporate sphere. Most
professional groups will continue to operate as partnerships for all practical
86. Alabama Professional Association Act, 2 P-H CORP. SERV. Ala. 221 (1961);
Arkansas Medical and Dental Corporation Acts, ARK. STAT. §§ 64-1701-17, -1801-17
(Supp. 1961); Connecticut Uniform Partnership Act, Conn. Pub. Acts 1961, No.
158, § 44 (all professions) and No. 394 (physicians); Florida Professional Service
Corporation Act, Fla. Laws 1961, c. 61-64 (Supp. No. 2, 1961); Georgia Profes-
sional Association Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-4301-18 (Supp. 1961); Illinois Act To
Authorize Professional Associations, ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 106%, §§ 101-09 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. No. 6, 1961); Minnesota Professional Corporation Act, Minn. Laws
1961 (Extra Session), c. I (Supp. No. 6, 1961) (physicians); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1785.01-.08 (Baldwin Supp. 1961); Oklahoma Professional Corporation Act,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 801-19 (Supp. No. 7, 1961); Pennsylvania Professional
Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, No. 416 (Supp. No. 7, 1961); South Dakota Medi-
cal Corporation Act, S.D. Laws 1961, c. 29; Tennessee Uniform Partnership Act,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-105 (Supp. 1961); Texas Laws 1961, c. 158, § 6(3) (Supp.
No. 3, 1961); Wisconsin Service Corporation Law, Wis. Laws 1961, c. 350 (Supp.
No. 5, 1961).
87. See COLO. Sup. CT. R. 231.
88. Opinion No. 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159 (1962).
89, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and
Wisconsin.
90. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee
and Texas.
91. Ohio.
92. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961); CoLo. SUP.
CT. R. 231.
93. State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962),
31 U. CINc. L. Rzv. 341 (1962), 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 104 (1962).
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purposes. Stock ownership in such a corporation will have less significance
than in other service corporations, for the professional man's share of the
corporate income will be essentially contingent upon his actual contribu-
tion to the production of that income, not upon mere ownership of stock.
Corporate assets will not be substantial since the personal capabilities of
the shareholders and other employees will constitute the primary income
producing assets of the corporation, rather than tangible assets. Therefore,
the intrinsic value of a share of stock in such a corporation belonging to a
deceased or retired member will be relatively small. It is further obvious
that a group of professionals will be reluctant to admit anyone to their
firm ("corporation") who lacks the unanimous approval of the present
members, just as they would have been when practicing under a partnership
agreement.
As will be seen later, these restrictions may prove bothersome to a
professional corporation seeking to make an election to be taxed as a
partnership under Subchapter S. Such points, however, raise an even more
fundamental problem: will the Commissioner accept a firm doing business
under such a statute as a bona fide corporation for purposes of the federal
tax law?
2. Validity of Professional Incorporation Statutes for Federal
Tax Purposes
Any discussion of the tax problems which will be encountered by the
professional man operating under an incorporation statute must start with
the question of the statute's validity-validity not in the sense of whether
state legislatures can authorize professional practice in such a form, but
instead whether these organizations, regardless of what a state may call
them, should be classified as "associations" or "corporations" within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 At least one writer, Professor
Bittker,95 has expressed severe doubts on the matter, and has argued most
persuasively that because the new statutes "impose restrictions on the pro-
fessional corporation that are not applicable to typical business corpora-
tions'98 as well as for additional policy reasons, they should not be granted
the desired tax consequences which led to their adoption.
Bittker first notes that organizations formed under such statutes face
94. See Comment, 75 Hiv. L. REv. 776 (1962).
95. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: SomeQuestions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961).
96. Id. at 3.
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attack from the Commissioner on several fronts, quite apart from their
qualification under Code section 7701(a)(3): (1) the assignment of in-
come doctrine,0 7 (2) the sham transaction theory, 8 (3) the theory of
professional persons as "independent contractors,"' 9 and (4) the personal
holding company tax.10 The basic problem, however, is whether the new
organizations really possess the required majority of the four characteristics
required by the "Kintner" Regulations, i.e., limited liability, centralization
of management, continuity of life, and free transferability of interests.10
Most of the statutes in question have been carefully drafted to preserve
"intact the entire congeries of relationships between an individual practi-
tioner and his patients and clients."'01 2 Thus it can be argued that a pro-
fessional association or corporation under such a statute will still constitute
a mutual agency relationship, with mutual liability existing among the
members as in the case of a partnership. 03 The difficulty in meeting the
Commissioner's requirement of limited liability is therefore obvious. Further-
more, the personal responsibility of a lawyer or physician is so vital to the
whole purpose of the organization that it is questionable whether there
can be any centralization of management in the sense required by the
Regulations. Each practitioner could presumably bind the organization by
his individual decision as to treatment or course of litigation to be fol-
lowed, risks to be assumed, etc.,--decisions fundamental to the organiza-
tion's purpose-in the same manner as in a partnership. As to continuity
of life, although the statutes purport to confer it, normally the organiza-
tion can avoid dissolution only by re-purchasing the shares of a disquali-
fied member. Thus, any member's disqualification from practice, election
to public office, death, bankruptcy or retirement might well imperil the
organization's life, since funds for the repurchase of a member's stock may
not be available at a critical time, or the organization may be forbidden by
state law to use its funds for such a purpose. Finally, free transferability of
interest for professional groups, argues Bittker, is nothing short of ludicrous,
regardless of the words utilized in the various statutes. 104 Even if the or-
97. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
98. See Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940). See also
Mayes v. United States, 207 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1953); W. B. Mayes, Jr., 21 T.C.
286 (1953).
99. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
100. See infra. notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
101. Supra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
102. Bittker, supra note 96, at 9.
103. Ibid.
104. Id. at 17.
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ganization's shares can be held by individuals merely licensed in the profes-
sion, as opposed to active practitioners, such shares are certainly much less
freely transferable than shares of the ordinary business corporation. Various
schemes regarding repurchase of shares upon a member's death or retire-
ment would be so likely to involve a complete reorganization of the financial
and professional arrangements of the firm that they would not achieve the
type of free transferability described in the Regulations. Bittker's verdict
is that the professional association or corporation possesses only doubtful
limited liability, a modified form of centralized management, doubtful con-
tinuity of life, and in most cases something less than a free transferability
of interests.10 5
Bittker finds no substantial difference between the "corporation" type
of statute and the "association" type of statute as far as federal tax con-
sequences are concerned. Simply calling something a "corporation" does
not necessarily make it such under the Internal Revenue Code. Bittker
illustrates the proposition with the extreme example of a state which modi-
fies a statute comparable to the Uniform Partnership Act by substituting
the word "corporation" for the word "partnership" wherever the latter
term appears. °0
Bittker further condemns professional corporation and association acts
upon a public policy basis. Although state law will often affect the federal
income tax burden of its citizens, "the statutes permitting the organization
of professional associations and corporations have no apparent purpose
other than federal tax reduction; they alter the non-tax results of profes-
sional practice in only minimum degree; and they would have, if successful,
a substantial effect on the federal revenue. '11 7 By way of contrast, Bittker
argues, even the enactment of community property systems before the in-
come-splitting provisions were written into the federal tax laws had private
law consequences, especially in the field of domestic relations, justifying
an exercise of the states' legitimate supervision in the area. Bittker's
objection to the new statutes is that the states have done little more than
apply new labels to the same relationships.
It should not be assumed, however, that Bittker's is the last word up-
on the subject. Professor Gryack, 08 in examining the same statutes, con-
105. Id. at 21.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Ibid.
108. Grayck, Professional Associations and the Kintner Regulations: Some
Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 469 (1962).
Cf. Comment, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 780-85 (1962).
1963]
23
Joyner et al.: Joyner: Tax Dilemma of the Self-Employed Professional
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
eludes that the "Kintner" Regulations are indeed met. Furthermore, one
should note a possible flaw in Bittker's public policy argument. While it is
indeed true that, after a moment's reflection, one may discern non-tax
consequences in the community property legislation of the 1940's, the ques-
tion actually seems to be one of motive, and it would be naive to pretend
that either professional corporation statutes or the community property
statutes of the 1940's were primarily motivated by anything other than tax
reasons.
How courts will eventually deal with the professional corporation for
federal tax purposes still seems open to question. Perhaps the only prognosis
that can be made at this stage is that a court's method of approach may
well be determinative. Thus, a court following the rationale of the "Kint-
ner" Regulations might well find Bittker's argument persuasive. On the
other hand, as pointed out in a preceding section of this article, a court
might well sustain a taxpayer even in face of the "Kintner" Regulations
and even without benefit of an association or corporation statute. A court
of this bent would undoubtedly sustain a taxpayer under a corporation or
association statute as well.
C. Tax Traps for the Professional Corporation or Association
Assuming that the statutes and court rules considered in the preceding
sections are effective under the "Kintner" Regulations to create corporations
or associations which qualify for corporate tax treatment, it becomes neces-
sary to explore some of the tax problems which these new entities will en-
counter. There are five main traps which such organizations must avoid.
1. Reasonableness of Withdrawals for Salaries
A common scheme employed by closely-held corporations to minimize
corporate income tax is to pay out the earnings of the corporation in the
form of salaries to officers and employees. Quite obviously, of course, the
payment of reasonable salaries is to be expected, and the corporation can
deduct "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation"'1 9 from
its gross income. As one might also expect, that which is "reasonable" is
hard to define.110 The normal rule of thumb is that the reasonableness of
salaries will be measured by comparison with salaries paid by other corpora-
109. I.R.C., § 162 (a)(1).
110. See Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 842 (9th
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tions similarly situated. : 1' This standard may prove almost impossible to
apply to professional corporations, however, inasmuch as it would be difficult
to find another similar firm to serve as a standard since the ability of the
particular members is the income producing asset. Furthermore, in a part-
nership senior partners often receive more compensation than their time
devoted to any particular problem would justify. Since the taxpayer has
the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of compensation,1 2 any attempt
to continue such standard partnership practices with regard to salaries may
be open to attack by the Commissioner.
2. Accumulated Earnings
In the past, closely-held corporations have often been tempted to ac-
cumulate corporate earnings in anticipation of a stock redemption, in order
that the individual shareholder will receive capital gains treatment upon the
redemption of his shares. This might well be an attractive device for a pro-
fessional corporation as well, were it not for the accumulated earnings pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code,"s which impose a tax of 27.5% on
the first $100,000 of accumulated taxable income, and 38.5%o on such income
over $100,000. "Accumulated taxable income" is defined as taxable income
for the year (with slight adjustments) minus: (a) a dividend paid deduc-
tion, and (b) an accumulated earnings credit."14 The accumulated earnings
credit, in turn, consists of a minimum lifetime credit of $100,000 plus any
part of the earnings and profits of the corporation for the taxable year that
are retained for the reasonable needs of the business." 5 Thus, retained
earnings and profits in excess of $100,000 may be subject to attack on the
ground of unreasonable accumulation. If such is shown to be the case,
code section 533(b) establishes that the corporation was formed or availed
of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax-the actual test for imposi-
tion of the accumulated earnings tax. 16
For a small professional corporation the accumulated earnings problem
will seldom arise, simply because such an organization would seldom accu-
mulate more than $100,000. In larger professional organizations, however,
the problem may at times become acute, particularly where the organization
seeks to set aside amounts for the future redemption of withdrawing mem-
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b) (3) (1958).
112. Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U.S. 227, 232 (1930).
113. I.R.C., §9 531-537.
114. I.R.C., § 535(a).
115. I.R.C., § 535(c).
116. I.R.C., § 532(a).
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bers' shares. The difficulty here would be in convincing the Commissioner
that such a redemption constitutes a legitimate business purpose.117 The
problem, of course, might also arise in other ways; in such a case the ques-
tion of reasonableness would probably be -determined in accordance with
the peculiarities of the particular profession involved." 8  It should be
noted, however, that the intelligent use of reserves for legitimate contin-
gencies and qualified deferred compensation plans (which in reality are the
primary reasons for establishing such corporations) will serve to alleviate
the problem."9
3. The Personal Holding Company Tax
Perhaps more troublesome to the average professional corporation
than the accumulated earnings tax will be the personal holding company
tax. 20 A corporation in which 50% of the outstanding stock is owned by
five or fewer persons may be subject to attack as a personal holding com-
pany if at least 80% of its gross income for the particular year is "personal
holding company income" which is not distributed within that year.' 2'
For determining ownership of stock the Code in section 544 has involved
constructive ownership rules which must be considered. "Personal holding
company income" consists of nine rather broad categories of income, notable
among which, as concerns the professional corporation, are amounts received
under personal service contracts.'2 2 This provision of the Code applies when-
ever some person other than the corporation (i.e., the client) has the right
to designate the member of the corporation who is to perform the services,
if the member so designated owned, during the taxable year, 25%o or more
of the outstanding stock of the corporation.123 Amounts subject to the per-
sonal holding company tax are taxed at a rate of 75% on the first $2,000
and 85%7 on amounts above $2,000.124
This area may well present something of a problem for the smaller
professional organization, partly because such organizations are the ones
117. See Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74
HARv. L. REV. 866 (1961).
118. As to what may constitute a legitimate accumulation, see Treas. Reg. §§
1.537-1(a), -2(b) (1959).
119. See Eber, The Pros and Cons of the New Professional Service Corpora-
tion, 15 J. TAXATION 308, 311 (1961).
120. I.R.C., §§ 541-547.
121. I.R.C., § 542(a).
122. I.R.C., § 543(a)(5).
123. It should be noted that the stock attribution rules of § 544 may cause
some problems in this area for small or family professional corporations.
124. I.R.C., § 541.
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most likely to run afoul of the stock ownership requirements, and partly
because when dealing with such organizations the client may more often
expect to select the person who is to perform the service. With larger or-
ganizations such problems are less likely to arise. Apparently the only
method of avoiding the tax other than distributing all the income would be
to make sure that at least 21% of the corporate income was either the result
of services performed by persons who were not designated by the client or
by persons who owned less than 25% of the corporation's outstanding stock.
The problem becomes particularly acute in view of the Treasury Regulations
that the services provided by such persons must be "important and essen-
tial" services.125 The only reasonable interpretation of this requirement is
that such services must be professional services rendered by professional
persons, not merely clerical or administrative work performed by secretaries
or investigators.
4. Stock Redemptions
A stock redemption is treated as a distribution in part or full payment
in exchange for the stock redeemed, and thus qualifies for capital gains or
loss treatment, if the redemption falls within one of four categories desig-
nated by the Code: (1) a redemption which is not essentially equivalent
to a dividend; (2) a redemption which is substantially disproportionate with
respect to the shareholder's stock; (3) a redemption which completely
terminates the shareholder's interest; (4) and redemptions in certain rail-
road reorganizations.126 Any stock redemption that does not fall within one
of these categories is treated as a simple distribution, constituting a dividend
to the extent of current and accumulated post-1913 earnings and profits, a
return of capital to the extent of the adjusted basis of the stock and a
gain from the sale or exchange of property to the extent of any excess. 1 2
As far as the professional corporation is concerned, of course, only the first
three categories will be applicable.
Since stock redemptions are the method by which professional corpora-
tions will seek to maintain their unity, and since all of the present statutes
authorizing professional corporations or associations have provided some
system by which the corporation or association may redeem stock of a
deceased, retired, expelled or disqualified shareholder 28 the stock redemp-
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.543-(b)(8)(ii) (1958).
126. I.R.C., §§ 302(a), (b).
127. I.R.C., § 301. See generally Bittker, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 138 (Student Ed. 1959).
128. See Bittker, supra note 96, at 38.
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tion provisions of the Code may prove to be of some importance to such
organizations. A problem for the small firm is that attribution rules 29 apply
in determining the ownership of the stock. 30 Under these rules, an indi-
vidual is considered as constructively owning any stock that is actually
owned by certain members of his "extended" family. Thus, where the
firm's shares are owned by a related group, the so-called family ownership
rule may impute to each person the ownership of all the corporate stock.' 3 '
This may mean that neither the "substantially disproportionate redemption"
category nor the "complete termination of shareholder's interest" category
will apply to a redemption of stock owned by such a person. It should be
noted, however, that as to the "complete termination of interest" category
the family ownership rule will not apply if: (a) immediately after the
redemption the former shareholder has no interest in the corporation other
than as a creditor; (b) the former shareholder does not acquire any such
interest (other than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10
years of such redemption; and (c) the former shareholder notifies the Com-
missioner of any such stock acquired by bequest or inheritance. 32 On the
other hand, "waiver" of the family ownership rule does not apply if within
10 years preceding the redemption the distributee either acquired some of
the redeemed stock from certain persons designated in the attribution
rules or prior to redemption transferred any stock to such a person if such
acquisition or transfer had "as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of federal income tax."3 3 A transfer is not presumed to have been made
for the purpose of tax avoidance merely because the transferee was in a
lower income tax bracket than the transferor, 84 a situation which might
easily apply to a transfer of corporate stock between a professional man and
his son. On the other hand, where the purpose of the transfer was to reduce
total family income taxes, this may prevent waiver of the family ownership
rule.
5. Income Averaging
The professional man employed by a professional corporation or asso-
ciation will lose the spreadback provisions now available to individuals and
129. I.R.C., § 318(a).
130. I.R.C., § 302(c)(1).
131. See Ringo, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the lIn-
ternal Revenue Code, 72 HAMv. L. REv. 209 (1958).
132. I.R.C., § 302(c) (2).
133. I.R.C., § 302(c) (2) (B).
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(g).
135. See Rev. Rul. 57-387, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 225; Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2
Cum. Bull. 177; Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 179.
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members of partnerships.186 These provisions, which allow income to be
averaged back over the time it was earned if it was earned over a period
of 36 months or more and the compensation received in one tax year is 80%
or more of the total, are obviously of great value to the professional. It is
questionable, therefore, whether the tax advantages to be gained from in-
corporation are substantial enough to outweigh this provision. The problem
will be particularly pressing for professional people in certain specialized
areas, e.g., the lawyer who specializes in personal injury litigation.
6. Miscellaneous Problems
Aside from the more or less standard problems which may be expected
to arise with regard to professional corporation taxation, there are several
other problems of varying importance which should be taken into considera-
tion. It should be noted, for instance, that a deferred compensation plan
established by a professional corporation or association, while more ad-
vantageous tax-wise than those presently allowed under H. R. 10 (con-
sidered in a later section of this article), may often be subject to attack as
discriminatory'a" unless care is used in their drafting. Again, the loss of
flexibility inherent in a professional firm's incorporation should be taken
into account. The feasibility of a centralized management for the large law
firm, where a committee of senior partners perhaps already wields great
power over fees, allocation of clients, salaries, hiring, etc., is one matter;
centralized management for a clinic's staff of physicians or for a small law
firm is quite another. Furthermore, withdrawal from a professional corpora-
tion in the event of disagreement may be difficult because of lack of any
ready market for the shares, particularly in the small firm, where the cor-
poration itself might not have the ready cash to redeem the shares of the
dissident member. 38 While a very loose association might avoid the
problems of centralized management and the dissident shareholder, such
an association is much more subject to attack as lacking a fundamental
corporate attribute required by the Code.
D. Subchuapter S and the Professional Corporation
Subchapter S was introduced into the Internal Revenue Code by the
136. I.R.C., § 1301.
137. See I.R.C., § 401(b)(4). See generally Treas. Reg. § 4.401-4; Rev. Rul.
57-163, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 128, parts 2(i), 5(a).
138. The proposed Missouri Professional Corporations Act, Mo. S. B. 108,
72d Gen. Ass. (1962), is silent on this point.
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Technical Amendments Act of 1958,13 with the avowed purpose of eliminat-
ing the consideration of federal income tax consequences in the selection
of a form of business organization for small businesses. 140 Under these
sections, a "small business corporation" is able to elect whether or not it
will be taxed under the provisions of the subchapter.14' Essentially a "small
business corporation" is1 42 a domestic corporation not a member of an
affiliated group with one class of stock and fewer than 11 individual
shareholders none of whom are nonresident aliens."43 No corporate tax
is paid if the election is made," and the corporation's current taxable
income is included on a per-share basis in the gross income of the share-
holders.?4 Generally, shareholders report this as ordinary income, except
for certain long-term capital gains which retain their character in the
shareholder's hands. 46
Subchapter S should prove particularly appealing for the professional
corporation or association. Under its terms, a qualifying professional cor-
poration or association can elect to have its current income included directly
in its shareholders' gross income without intervening corporate tax,'14 7
thereby relieving such income from the spectres of accumulated earnings
and personal holding company taxes. Furthermore, shareholder-employees
apparently would not forfeit their qualified pension and profit-sharing plans
or other fringe benefits by making such an election.'4 Thus, the combina-
tion of a professional corporation and an election under Subchapter S
would allow employees of the corporation to gain deferred compensation
benefits and at the same time relieve the corporation of most of the tax
traps detailed in the previous section.
As an added inducement to a Subchapter S election, there is an
income shifting feature which partly makes up for the loss of the spread-
back provisions available only to individuals or partners. Any undistributed
taxable income is taxed to all shareholders as if a pro rata distribution
139. 72 Stat. 1606 (1958).
140. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1952).
141. I.R.C., § 1372(a).
142. I.R.C., § 1371(a).
143. I.R.C., § 1504.
144. I.R.C., § 1372(b).
145. I.R.C., § 1373(b).
146. I.R.C., § 1373(d), 1375(a).
147. I.R.C., §§ 1372(b)(1), 1373(a).
148. Comment, 75 HAv. L. REv. 776, 792 (1962). Bills to prevent shareholder-
employees from enjoying this best of two possible worlds have been introduced in
Congress, but failed to come to a vote. Id. at 792 n.96.
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were made on the last day of the taxable year. 4 9 This offers some income
shifting possibilities. If each "member" of the firm owns one share or an
equal number of shares, regardless of whether such person would be a senior
partner or a junior partner in a conventional partnership, the undistributed
taxable income would be divided equally among all shareholders, thus keep-
ing unwanted income out of the hands of the members of the firm in the
highest tax brackets.150
Unfortunately, however, the very complexity of Subchapter S has
caused several problems.'51 As concerns the electing professional corpora-
tion, some of these problems warrant further discussion in detail.
The portion of an electing corporation's income not actually distributed
in a particular year is taxed on a "as if" basis at the end of the year. The
amount of such "as if" dividends is then added to the basis of the stock.1 2
Basis is then reduced when the previously taxed income is actually dis-
tributed in a later year, such distribution being tax free.15 3 Dividends may
be earmarked either as to current or prior years' income. 54 If the election
is terminated, however, distributions thereafter will be treated as coming
out of current corporate earnings, not the undistributed taxable income of
prior election years on which the tax has already been paid. 55
To qualify under Subchapter S, a corporation can have no more than
ten shareholders, 56 and issuance of shares to more than ten persons will
terminate an election. 57 This presents troublesome problems for the pro-
fessional corporation which desires to operate much as it would if a partner-
ship. If, in an organization of ten members, a retiring "partner" keeps his
shares, or because of his death they remain outstanding, the firm will not
be able to admit new practitioners as shareholders. Or, if the shares held
by a deceased shareholder are distributed to several legatees, the number
of shareholders may become too great. If shares become part of a trust,
149. I.R.C., § 1373(b).
150. See the illustrations given in Treas. Reg. § 1.13 73-1(g). As concerns a pro-
fessional corporation, it is presumed that a "senior" member's salary or other com-
pensation would be higher than that of a "junior" member's.
151. See Axelrad, Choice of Form: Partnership, Corporation, or In-Between,
N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 361 (1961); Greene, Practitioners Experiences
With Subchapter S Reveal Many Doubts, Fears; Use Is Limited, 10 J. TAX.rxoM
130 (1959).
152. I.R.C., § 1376(a).
153. I.R.C., §§ 1373(b), 1375(b)(1).
154. I.R.C., § 1375(d) (1).
155. See Hart, Automatic Termination, A Real Danger to Electing Corporation,
10 J. TAXATION 138 (1959).
156. I.R.C., § 1371(a)(1).
157. I.R.C., § 1372(e)(3).
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the election is automatically terminated. " 8 Needless to say, careful planning
can prevent these things from happening, but it would seem that somewhere
one reaches a point of diminishing returns. It may be that the rigid re-
quirements of Subchapter S would work a revolution in the organization of
law firms, so that even the largest firms would have a very small number
of shareholders, with the rest being associate employees. Perhaps, however,
this would run against the grain of a profession which has long equated
partnership in the firm with professional achievement.
A "small business corporation" can have only one class of stock."59 Any
differences as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences
will be considered as creating a different class of stock. 6 0 Thus, the pro-
fessional corporation would have to pay the same dividends and afford the
same right to participate in management to all shareholders, whether
Csenior partners" or "associates," or be disqualified. On the other hand,
the professional corporation or association acts all provide that no layman
can exercise the rights of a shareholder in professional organizations. When
an estate owns shares, but due to the incorporation statute cannot exercise
the right to elect the management of the corporation, will this be held to
create a second class of stock, and terminate the Subchapter S election?
An election under Subchapter S must be made by all shareholders of
the corporation,"6 within the first month of the taxable year or the preced-
ing month, 162 and remains in effect until terminated. A new shareholder
must consent to the election, or it terminates. 63 The Regulations require
consent to be filed within 30 days after becoming a new shareholder."" This
suggests a danger: a dissident member of an incorporated professional firm,
unable to sell his shares, could exercise his spite by terminating the firm's
election. The same could be done by the executor of an estate.
In order to retain substantial control over the admission of new prac-
titioners to the firm, i.e., making them shareholders, and to assure continued
qualification as a small business corporation, the transferability of shares
should be restricted and redemption provided for in certain situations. The
corporation should have the first opportunity to purchase in the event of
transfer, if the proposed transferee does not meet the approval of the other
158. I.R.C., § 1371(a)(2); Treas. Reg. 1.371-1(e) (1959).
159. I.R.C., § 1371(a)(4).
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (1959).
161. I.R.C., § 1372(a).
162. I.R.C., § 1372(c)(1).
163. I.R.C., § 1372(e) (1).
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b).
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practitioners in the firm. In view of Subchapter S, an arrangement whereby
new shareholders are issued stock only by the corporation, the by-laws of
which would require a unanimous vote of the present shareholders, and an
arrangement for automatic redemption of shares of deceased or retired
shareholder-members, would be most effective. 1 5 Again, however, it will
be remembered that the "Kintner" Regulations require that each member
must have the power, without consent of the other members, to substitute
another person for himself in holding his interest in the corporation or asso-
ciation. 66
E. Ethical Considerations
Objections to professional people incorporating are based in part merely
upon the fact that the solo practitioner and the partnership are the tradi-
tional forms of offering professional services. This feeling for the traditional
way of doing things is so strong that it was once questioned whether a lawyer
should become the employee of a corporation. However, there are valid
objections to the professional corporation. Imposing an entity between the
lawyer and client might indeed weaken a highly individual and confidential
relationship. Since the lawyer would be an employee of the professional
corporation, and probably also a stockholder in it, his primary duty might
be to his employer rather than to his client. Furthermore, since the client
would be doing business with the corporation rather than the individual
practitioner, this might insulate the lawyer from liability for his negligence.
Again, the corporate attribute of free transferability of shares could result
in the transfer of shares, carrying with them the right to elect the manage-
ment of the law firm, into the hands of unlicensed laymen. Finally, while
the individual lawyer is rigorously examined, licensed and disciplined by
his profession, the corporate entity might not be.6 7
A general answer to all these objections is that the professional man
practicing in corporate form will remain an individual member of his
profession, with all its ethical duties, and subject to its regulations. This is
so because legislatures and courts, being aware of the objections to pro-
fessional corporations, have drawn the statutes and court rules to meet
these very problems. Thus the American Bar Association's Committee on
Professional Ethics has given its approval, conditioned upon such restrictions
165. See Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 353, 361
(1958).
166. See the discussion supra at notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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and safeguards, to professional corporations for members of the legal pro-
fession.10 8 The medical profession has actively explored the possibilities of
corporate practice,"69 which seems to have enjoyed legal approval in Missouri
for half a century.17  Accountants apparently occupy a similar position.171
Apart from such general matters, however, lawyers seeking to practice
their profession in the corporate form face a special problem. Because of
their historic role as officers of the courts, most state courts assert a power
to regulate their admission to practice and manner of practice, without
regard to what the legislature has to say on the subject.1 2 This position is
supported by the fact that most state constitutions make explicit the separa-
tion of the government into three separate branches-executive, legislative,
and judicial-while in the United States Constitution this is only implicit.
Furtherore, most state constitutions give the state supreme court the
right to regulate the practice of law, while the United States Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is only that set out in Article III, in which such power
is not granted. 173
It is arguable that under the Missouri Constitution only the Supreme
Court could authorize a professional corporation for lawyers.1 74 In Clark v
Austi ,79 the Supreme Court punished for contempt of court three persons
who had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The court relied upon
a statutory definition of the practice of law, the statute making such un-
authorized practice a misdemeanor. One judge concurred in the result, but
reasoned that the statute was invalid on the ground that only the court
could define the practice of law. 76 The majority held that the legislature
could define practice of law so long as it did not attempt to frustrate the
power of the court to define and regulate the practice of law and admission
168. Opinion No. 303, 48 A.B.A.J. 159 (1962).
169. See Jones, supra note 166, at 355-58.
170. State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1907).
171. § 326.020, RSMo 1959, authorizes accountants to practice their profession
in corporate form, even though the accounting profession flatly forbids it as a mat-
ter of professional ethics, Rule 11, Rules of Professioial Conduct, American Insti-
tute of Accountants, 1 C. P. A. HANDBOOK 6 (1950).
172. See, e.g., Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961); In re
Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194
N.E. 313 (1935); Olmstead's Case, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928).
173. As to the nature and extent of courts' power over attorneys generally, see
Comment, 47 IowA L. REv. 984, 985 (1962).
174. See Mo. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1,5. See also Mo. Sup. Or. R. 4.35. On separa-
tion of powers between the branches of the government, see Mo. CONsT. art. 2.
175. 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937).
176. Id. at 979.
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to the bar. In Hoffmeister v. Tod,177 the court unanimously adopted the
theory of co-ordinate power of the court enunciated in Clark. Thus it would
appear that the Supreme Court could, consistently with this line of cases,
ignore a statute purporting to permit lawyers to practice in a corporate form.
Where the courts have had their say in the past they have generally
manifested a hostile attitude toward a corporation of lawyers. It Re Co-
operative Law Co.17 1 represents the classic viewpoint, laid down half a cen-
tury ago by the New York Court of Appeals, to the effect that a lawyer
must work for his client, not for a corporation-employer.
More recently the courts seem to have taken three approaches to the
current pressure for professional incorporation. Exemplifying one such ap-
proach, Florida's Supreme Court amended its bar integration rule and code
of ethics to enable lawyers to qualify under that state's new professional
corporation act.1 7 9 However, it warned members of the bar that they must
preserve "all of the traditional obligations and responsibilities of the lawyer.
*.."180 The court emphasized that
The individual practitioner, whether a stockholder in a corporation
or otherwise, will continue to be expected to abide by all of the
Rules and Canons of professional ethics heretofore or hereafter re-
quired of him. The corporate entity as a method of doing business
will not be permitted to protect the unfaithful or the unethical....
[T]he corporate entity itself will automatically come within the
ambit of our jurisdiction in regard to discipline. In addition to the
individual liability and responsibility of the stockholder, the corpo-
rate entity will be liable for the misprisions of its members to the
extent of corporate assets .... 8L
Thus the court upon petition added its imprimatur to what the legislature
had authorized.
Ohio recently enacted a statute which specifically authorized lawyers,
and others, to form professional corporations. Representing the second type
177. 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1961). Accord, I& re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63
S.W.2d 672 (1933); State ex rel. Selleck v.Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S.W. 671(1913); Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S.W. 914 (1912). The Hoff neister
decision seems to be in line with the general American rule.
178. 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). Accord, Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga.
511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531,
209 Pac. 363 (1922); People ex rel. State Bar Ass'n. v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); State v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 105
Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
179. In the Matter of the Flordia Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
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of approach, the Ohio Supreme Court held that until the court, through its
rules for admission to practice, saw fit to permit a corporate entity to
practice law, the secretary of state did not even have to accept for filing
articles of incorporation from a corporation authorized by the statute! 8 2
The court based its holding upon its "inherent power to prescribe standards
for admission to the practice" which it held was "inherent in the judicial
branch of government .. .'1 A statute also gave the court the power to
admit to practice, but the court apparently regarded this as superfluous.
Illustrative of the third and most liberal approach, the Colorado
Supreme Court recently amended its rules to permit lawyers to form pro-
fessional service corporations under the Colorado Corporation Code, a gen-
eral business corporation act. 84 However, the court rule spells out the
same kind of requirements that are found elsewhere in special statutes.
It is submitted that the Hoffmeistei48 5 decision may indicate that the
Missouri Supreme Court will take the same attitude manifested by the
Ohio court; that is, the court will have to authorize lawyers to practice in
corporate form, regardless of what general provisions the legislature may
enact concerning professional corporations.
Assuming finally that it becomes possible for Missouri lawyers to
practice in the corporate form, and that the Supreme Court will not wish to
give the professional corporation of lawyers any advantages not enjoyed
by lawyers practicing in partnerships, the Missouri court rules themselves
present several miscellaneous problems. For instance, partnerships of
lawyers cannot include persons who are not members of the Missouri Bar,
duly licensed to practice in this state and amenable to professional disci-
pline; nor can the partnership have an associate who does not meet this
qualification. 86 This eliminates a partnership of lawyers practicing in vari-
ous cities in several states, which most states allow. How will this affect a
corporation of lawyers? Furthermore, in Missouri a partnership of lawyers
cannot use a trade name, but must use the names of living, active part-
ners.1 7 The Florida Supreme Court amended its rules to allow the use of
a fictitious name by a professional corporation of lawyers.88 Colorado's
182. State ex rel. Greene v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962),
31 U. CINc. L. REv. 341 (1962), 14 SRAcusE L. REv. 104 (1962).
183. 173 Ohio St. at 115, 180 N.E.2d at 158.
184. CoLo. Sup. CT. R. 265 (1961).
185. Supra note 178.
186. Mo. Sup. Or. R. 4.33.
187. Ibid.
188. In the Matter of the Flordia Bar, sunpra note 180, at 558, 559.
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court rule1s 9 and the American Bar Association's Committee 9 require the
use of individual's names, as in the partnership's firm name, plus the words
"professional company" or "professional corporation" or abbreviations there-
of. Apparently this is a matter that would have to be dealt with by court
rule. The canon that lawyers and members of other professions, or lawyers
and nonprofessionals, cannot form a partnership where their activities will
consist in part of practicing law, would of course apply to the professional
corporation.
IV. "DiRcT" METHODS OF ESTABLISING EQUALITY-
THE SELF-EMPLOYED INriviDuAxs TAx RETIREMENT ACT OF 1962
A. Background
The foregoing sections have dealt with what might be termed "indirect"
methods of achieving tax equality in the deferred compensation field; that
is, with methods by which the self-employed individual might insure a
designation of himself as a "corporate" or "association" employee. Quite
apart from such attempts, however, there exists, and has always existed,
one very simple method of providing tax equality for the self-employed-
simple at least in its approach: direct legislation by Congress. In reality, it
was in this area that the greatest opportunity for success appeared to lie.
Thus, it was with a sigh of relief that most self-employed professionals
greeted the enactment of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
Act of 1962. And thus, in similar fashion, it was with a sigh of despair that
most of them later greeted the realization that the act was far from the
great equalizer desired.
The Congressional struggle for some measure of tax equality for self-
employed individuals dates back to the middle 1940's, when various groups
first began approaching the problem.' 91 The original Keogh-Reed bill, which
189. Supra note 185.
190. Supra note 169.
191. For a more complete history of the early work in this area, see REPORT OF
COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL INCOME TAx SECTION oF TAXATION OF A.B.A. 78 (1947);
Bronston, Progress Report on Self-Employed Retirement Act, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES
1204 (1959); Corbett, Retirement for Self-Employed, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 632
(1958); Donohue, Smathers-Keogh-Simpson Legislation Retirement Savings for
the Self-Employed, 45 A.B.A.J. 795 (1959); Keogh, Tax Equity for the Self-Em-
ployed, 47 A.B.A.J. 665 (1961); Polisher, The Self-Employed Individual's Retire-
ment Bill of 1959, 37 TAXES 321 (1959); Rapp, Pensions for the Self-Employed:
The Treasury Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAx L. REv. 227 (1961);
Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of
the Jenkins-Keogk Bill, 14 TAx L. REv. 55 (1958); Silverson, A New Tax Proposal,
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evolved from the work of some of these groups, was first introduced in Con-
gress in the late summer of 1951.192 It provided for an exclusion of the
lesser of 10%o of earned income or $7500, when paid into a restricted retire-
ment fund, with a lifetime limit of $150,000 and a five year carryover on
unused exclusions. The bill granted tax exemption to the trust on its earn-
ings; the trustee of the fund was required to be a bank; and investments
were limited to those which were legal for investment of trust funds by
such a bank. Distributions could not be made without penalty prior to
age sixty except in the event of total and permanent disability. When
made, lump sum distributions were to be given captial gains treatment, as
are distributions from qualified employee plans; installment or annuity
payments were taxable on receipt at ordinary rates.
The bill was reintroduced at each session of Congress in substantially
the same form until 1955,193 when certain changes of a technical nature
were made to integrate its provisions with the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The bill was also amended in committee to reduce the dollar limit
on the annual exclusions from $7,500 to $5,000, and the aggregate life-time
exclusions from $150,000 to $100,000.
In 1957, when the bill was reintroduced, the exclusion was changed to
a deduction from gross income, with the limits of the lesser of 10% of net
earnings from self-employment income or $5,000. The lifetime limit of
$100,000 was retained from the 1955 draft of the bill.
In 1958 the bill was passed by the House after a committee amendment
had reduced the annual deductible amount to the lesser of 10%o of net
earnings from self-employment or $2,500, and cut the lifetime limit on de-
ductions to $50,000 for any one individual. The bill was lost in the last
minute rush of the Senate for adjournment and thus failed of enactment
in 1958."'*
Although reintroduced at each session of Congress thereafter, it was
not until 1962 that H.R. 10,195 in its modified form, was finally enacted
after a conference committee had reconciled the House and Senate versions
64 AM. MERCURY 345 (1947); Silverson, Earned Income and Ability to Pay, 3
TAx. L. REv. 299 (1947); Silverson, Taxation and the Self-Employed: A Study in
Retrogression, 41 A.B.A.J. 50 (1955); 114 J. oF AccouNTANCY 24 (1962); 114 J.
oF ACCOUNTANCY 26 (1962).
192. H.R. 4371 (Keogh) and H.R. 4373 (Reed), 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
193. H.R. 9 (Jenkins) and H.R. 10 (Keogh), 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
194. See the chart at 107 CONG. Rrc. 9466 (1961), which indicates the trend
of limitations on contributions and deductions permitted in bills introduced before
the House.
195. Public Law 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962).
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of the bill. It became effective for the tax years beginning after December
31, 1962.---
As finally enacted, H.R. 10 provides some of the benefits of the qualified
employee plans to the self-employed by treating the latter as their own em-
ployees for this purpose 97 The provisions of the bill cover all persons
presently subject to the self-employment tax as well as doctors and
ministers, who are not presently covered by that tax."5s
B. Modus Operandi of H.R. 10
Designed to operate within the existing Code framework, the changes
made by H.R. 10 occur primarily in the form of additions to Code section
401. These may be briefly treated as follows:
(1) The basic concept of "employee" is broadened to include9 9 any
individual who has "earned income" derived from "self employ-
ment earnings," as those two terms are defined by Code sections
911 (b) and 1402 (a) respectively, for the taxable year200 or any
prior taxable year.201
(2) Segregated within the general concept of "employee" are those de-
fined in Code section 401 (c)(3) as "owner-employees. '2°2 As to
a plan including such persons, rather stringent new requirements
196. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 § 8, 76 Stat. 831
(1962).
197. For a general discussion of H.R. 10 see Adams, Retirement Plans for the
Self-Employed Lawyer?, 17 REcoRD 528 (1962); Becker, Self-Employed Retirement
Plans and H.R. 10, 49 A.B.A.J. 39 (1963); Coughlin, The Self-Employed Individ-
uals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 13 MONTHLY DIGEST OF TAx ARTIcLES 1 (Nov.
1962); Donnelly, Federal Tax Law for Self-Employed Individuals: The Application
of the New Retirement Plan to the Legal Profession, 23 GAVEL 12 (1963); Epstein,
Tax Deduction Retirement Plans for the Self-Employed: Present Plans and Future
Prospects, 2 L. OFF. EcoN. & MAN. 7 (1962); Forster, H.R. 10-What Does It
Profit A Man? 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 978 (1962); Johnson, Keogh Act: Past,
Present, and Future, 17 J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 101 (1963); MacNeil, What Price
H.R. 10 Today?, 102 TRuSTS & ESTATES 9 (1963); White & Peterson, Some Ques-
tions and Answers: The Keogh Act, 37 CALIF. S.B.J. 909 (1962); 36 CONN. B.J. 271(1962); 31 FoRDnlAM L. REV. 519 (1963); 31 U. CINc. L. REV. 434 (1962).
198. I.R.C., § 401(c) (2) (A) (i).
199. The word "include" is here emphasized to direct attention to the fact that
the definition of "employee" as used in section 401 (c) is not all-inclusive, but
merely an addition to the definition under the older law.
200. See also I.R.C., § 401(c) (1) (A), which includes those who would have
fallen within the definition of § 401(c) (1) except for the fact that no net profit
was shown for the year.
201. I.R.C., § 401(c) (1) (B).
202. It should be noted that this definition does not cover all those covered
under § 401(c) (1). See generally §§ 1402(c) (2) and 401(c) (2) (A).
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are imposed, in addition to the ones enumerated in section 401 (a).
These restrictions are discussed in some detail in a later section of
this article.
It would be helpful, at this point, to recall the general discussion of
qualified deferred compensation plans set forth previously in section II.
Since H.R. 10 is, in essence, simply an enlargement of the definition of
"employee," the basic types of plans which may be established remain un-
changed, with one relatively minor addition. Thus the provisions of H.R.
10 extend to the self-employed the same variety of plans formerly available
only to "regular" employees. Briefly, the self-employed individual may set
up either a pension plan or a profit-sharing plan. (The stock bonus plan is
inapplicable to the self-employed individual because of the nature of his
business organization.) It should be noted, however, that as to profit shar-
ing plans benefiting owner-employees H.R. 10 has revived the requirement of
a definite formula for determining the contributions to be made on behalf
of persons benefited.20 3 As to corporate plans this requirement had been
dropped by the Treasury in 1956,204 but apparently Congress felt a need20 ,
to revive the provision as to qualified plans for the self-employed.
Another inexpensive and convenient method of establishing a qualified
plan is the bond purchase plan, newly established by H.R. 10. The self-
employed individual (the plan is applicable to corporations as well) can
invest the contributions for himself and his employees, if any, by direct
purchase of a new series of U.S. Government bonds designed to meet the
requirements for investment of these funds. 206
C. Coverage Necessary to Qualify the Plan
For purposes of the following discussion, three terms will be used to
classify the various types of persons who may be covered by a qualified
plan. "Regular employee" is any person who fits the pre-1962 classification
of an employee. "Self-employed person" is the broad term covering all self-
employed individuals regardless of their ownership interest. "Owner-em-
ployee," a new classification created by H.R. 10, is defined20 7 as a self-em-
203. I.R.C., § 401(d) (2) (B).
204. T.D. 6189, 56 Cum. Bull. 972 (1956).
205. See S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1961). See also proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(d), 28 Fed. Reg. 3413 (1963).
206. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1961). For background on the
bond funding idea see Silverson, Earned Income and Ability to Pay, 3 T~x L.
Rnv. 299 (1948).
207. I.R.C., § 401(c) (3).
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ployed person either owning an unincorporated trade or business, or a
partner owning at least ten percent of either the capital or profits of the
partnership. A "self-employed person not an owner-employee" is any self-
employed person who does not own ten percent of a partnership. Most of
the new restrictions apply to plans which benefit one or more owner-em-
ployees.
Qualified plans benefiting owner-employees must meet the requirements
imposed on qualified plans for regular employees, 208 as well as additional
requirements set up by H.R. 10. Briefly, these new provisions state that
the trustee must ordinarily be a bank;20 1 that employees' rights to con-
tributions when made must be non-forfeitable;210 that there must be a
definite formula for determining contributions for employees to a profit-
sharing plan;211 that all full-time employees with three years service must
be covered; 212 that contributions may not be provided for any owner-em-
ployee unless he has consented to coverage, and that no benefits may be
paid to him prior to age 59Y2 unless he becomes permanently disabled;213
that excess contributions and premature distributions are prohibited; 214 that
the plan may be integrated with Social Security payments if not more than
one-third of the deductible contributions made by the employer are for the
benefit of owner-employees;215 that a deceased owner-employee's interest
must be distributed within five years of his death to his beneficiary or
applied to purchase an immediate annuity;21 6 that excess contributions and
attributable income must be repaid to an owner-employee on whose behalf
they were made; 217 that a qualified plan which covers an owner-employee
who controls another trade or business 2'8 must be combined with any plan
established for such other trade or business for purposes of determining
whether combined plans meet the requirements for coverage, contribution
limits and deductions; 21 9 that the plan must not provide contributions or
benefits for any owner-employee who controls another trade or business un-
less the employees of the controlled trade or business are covered by a
208. I.R.C., § 4 01(a).
209. I.R.C., § 401(d)(1).
210. I.R.C., § 401(d) (2) (A).
211. I.R.C., § 401(d) (2) (B).
212. I.R.C., § 401(d)(3).
213. I.R.C., § 401(d)(4).
214. I.R.C., § 401(d)(5).
215. I.R.C., § 401(d)(6).
216. I.R.C., § 401(d) (7).
217. I.R.C., § 401(d) (8).
218. I.R.C., § 401(d) (9) (B).
219. I.R.C., § 401(d) (9) (A).
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qualified plan; 22 0 and that contributions on behalf of an owner-employee
may be made only from earned income derived with respect to the trade or
business for which the plan was established.221 These requirements are dis-
cussed in more detail in the sections following.
There is no problem in determining who must be covered under a
qualified plan established by an owner-employee. The rules are very clear
that all employees of the owner-employee minst be covered by the plan if
any benefits are to be provided for the owner-employee.222 The only ex-
ceptions provide that the term "employee" does not include a person em-
ployed for less than three years, or one who is employed part time-twenty
hours or less per week or not more than five months in a calendar year.223
However, if an owner-employee establishes a qualified plan for his employees
only and does not receive benefits himself, the more liberal coverage rules
governing qualified employee plans apply, permitting reasonable classifica-
tion of employees for purp6ses of providing benefits. 224
An important term is "earned income,' ' 225 defined as net earnings from
self-employment as defined in § 1402 (a). The limit on contributions which
may be made on behalf of an owner-employee is computed as a percentage
of his earned income, in turn derived from his net earnings from self-em-
ployment.228
Where the owner-employee controls two or more businesses, he must
treat all the businesses as one for purposes of determining employee cover-
age. 227 Thus the professional man who practices alone and has no employees
in that practice will be forced to cover the employees of another business
which he controls 228 as an owner-employee in order to establish a qualified
plan to which he may make contributions for himself as an owner-employee.
This provision presents a decided disadvantage to be considered by an
owner-employee who is contemplating the establishment of a qualified
220. I.R.C., § 401(d)(10).
221. I.R.C., § 401(d)(11).
222. I.R.C., § 401(d)(3).
223. Ibid.
224. I.R.C., § 401(a)(3),(5).
225. I.R.C., § 401(c) (2) (A).
226. I.R.C., § 404(e) (1). A further complication is introduced by the defini-
tion of earned income when both personal services and capital are material income
producing factors. Section 911 (b) defines earned income in such a situation as up
to 30% of the net profits from such trade or business. Section 401(c) (2) (B) adds
the requirement that the taxpayer render siubstantialy full time services; provided,
however, that the first $2,500 of net profits are considered as earned income with-
out regard to the percentage computation under section 911(b).
227. I.R.C., § 401(d) (9) (A), (B).
228. I.R.C., § 401(d) (9) (B).
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plan: will the contributions for the benefit of employees of the controlled
business overbalance the tax advantage to be gained by establishing the
plan for himself in his solo practice? Furthermore, the benefits provided for
the employees of the controlled business must be as favorable as the ones
for his benefit.229 However, a self-employed person owning 10% or less of
a partnership, and therefore falling outside the owner-employee classifica-
tion, would not be forced to establish a qualified plan for employees of a
business which he controls as an owner-employee in order for contributions
to a qualified plan to be made for him by the partnership.
230
If a partner owning more than 10%o of the partnership also controls
another business as an owner-employee, he can escape the necessity of
establishing a plan for the employees in the controlled business by refusing
coverage to himself under the plan established by the partnership. 23' Since
no benefits will be provided under the plan for him, he is not under an
obligation to provide equal benefits for his employees. 23 2 While an owner-
employee must consent to coverage before contributions to a qualified plan
may be made for his benefit, the proposed Regulations announce that this
consent may be implied from the fact that contributions are in fact made
on his behalf.23
Closely related to the problem of necessary coverage to establish a
qualified plan is the problem of when the benefits under the plan must vest
in the beneficiaries. Under corporate plans, the time for vesting may be de-
ferred for a period of years or until retirement. A qualified plan including
an owner-employee, however, must provide for immediate vesting in the
employees at the time the contributions are made.23 4 Furthermore, under an
amendment to the Code applicable to all qualified plans, contributions must
be vested in the benefited employees upon termination of the plan, 235 a
provision which merely enacts a prior requirement insisted upon by the
Treasury before approving a plan.2S6
D. Funding Methods Available
A wide variety of funding devices are available in establishing a quali-
fied plan, ranging from a formal plan to simple and direct plans involving
229. I.R.C., § 401(d)(10).
230. I.R.C., § 401(c)(3).
231. I.R.C., § 401(d) (4) (A).
232. I.R.C., § 401(d) (4) (A), (d) (10).
233. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(b) (1), 28 Fed. Reg. 3412 (1963).
234. I.R.C., § 401(d) (2) (A).
235. I.R.C., § 401(a) (7).
236. See Rev. Rul. 61-157, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 88, part 5(c) (2).
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the purchase of nontransferable annuities or special-issue government bonds.
If the number of employees and the expected contributions warrant
the expense and trouble involved, the employer may create a trust plan. If
a self-employed individual sets up a trust plan for the exclusive benefit of
regular-employees, there is no change in the present rules and the employer
may be the trustee if he so desires. If an owner-employee is covered by the
trust plan, however, several new rules are applicable in addition to prior
requirements.2 37 In such a case the trustee must be a bank as defined in
section 401(d)(1), although another person, including the employer, may
be granted the power of control over investment of the trust funds. 238 Pre-
sumably the funds may be invested in any proper trust investment for a
bank under applicable law. An exception to the bank rule, allowing a wider
range of investments, is provided where the trustee funds the trust through
the exclusive use of annuity, endowment or life insurance contracts, and
the insurance company supplies certain required information about owner-
employees. 239
The scope of prohibited transactions between a qualified trust and the
employer has been expanded by H.R. 10 where the trust covers any owner-
employees who control the business. The trustee is absolutely prohibited
from loaning any part of the trust fund to, paying any compensation for
services rendered to it by, buying any property from, or selling any property
to an owner-employee who controls 240 the trade or business for which the
plan was established. 241 These are absolute prohibitions and the presence
of full and fair consideration does not alter them. Congress felt the need
for tightening the rules on prohibited transactions because of the extreme
difficulty in policing the number of small trusts that could be established
under H.R. 10. 4 2
An alternative funding method is the use of a custodial account, which,
if certain requirements are met, is treated as if it were a trust.24 3 The
custodian must be a bank,2 "4 and the investments of all funds must be
either exclusively in regulated investment company stock 245 (mutual fund
shares) or in annuity, endowment, or life insurance contracts.246
237. I.R.C., §§ 401(a), 503.
238. I.R.C., § 401(d)(1).
239. Ibid.
240. I.R.C., § 401(d)(9)(B).
241. I.R.C., § 503(j)(1).
242. H.R. Rep. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1961).
243. I.R.C., § 401(f).
244. I.R.C., § 401(f) (1) (B).
245. I.R.C., § 401(f) (1) (C) (i).
246. I.R.C., § 401(f)(1)(C)(ii).
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Other methods of funding include the direct purchase of (1) nontrans-
ferable annuity contracts from an insurance company without the interven-
tion of a trust or custodial account; 247 (2) nontransferable face-amount
certificates as defined in section 2(a)(15) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940;248 or (3) special series United States bonds. 24 9 All of these methods
are similar in that they tie up the plan funds until the retirement of the
beneficiary. A review of the characteristics of the bonds illustrates this
clearly. The bonds are nontransferable, 250 provide interest or yield only up-
on redemption, 25  and may not be redeemed prior to age 592, death, or
permanent disability. 252 As a finishing touch, Congress provided that
interest on the bonds must stop within five years of the bond owner's
death,25 3 "to prevent their use for purposes other than retirement.
'25 4
E. Contributions & Deductions
We come now to a section that goes to the very heart of the self-em-
ployed professional's problem. Just how much can an owner-employee or
other self-employed individual contribute to a qualified plan for his own
benefit, and to what extent may he deduct the amount of his contribution?
1. Contributions
Contributions may be of two kinds: (1) those made by the employer
for the employee, and (2) those made by the employee for his own benefit.
Only the former are deductible. This distinction is preserved in H.R. 10
and must be kept in mind in the following discussion.
An employer, as such, may contribute to a qualified plan, for the bene-
fit of an owner-employee, the lesser of 10% of his earned income2 2 or
$2,500.28 This is a maximum figure, and if an owner-employee is covered by
two or more qualified plans the aggregate of the contributions cannot ex-
ceed this amount." 7 In computing the amount of contribution, however,
any amount allocable to the purchase of current insurance protection is to
be disregarded.258
247. I.R.C., § 404(a) (2).
248. 15 U.S.C., § 80(a) (2). See I.R.C., § 401(g).
249. I.R.C., § 405.
250. I.R.C., § 405 (b) (1) (E).
251. I.R.C., § 405 (b) (1) (A).
252. I.R.C., § 405(b) (1) (D).
253. I.R.C., § 405(b) (1) (C).
254. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1961).
255. Earned income is defined in § 401(c) (2).
256. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1).
257. Ibid.
258. I.R.C., § 404(e) (3).
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The only exception to the limit on maximum contributions which may
be made on behalf of an owner-employee is in the case of certain level
premium insurance contracts used to invest the funds. In this instance a
three year averaging provision is employed, allowing the annual contribu-
tions to be calculated on the basis of the average annual earned income
for the three years.2 59 Only in this limited situation are the penalties for ex-
cess contributions inapplicable.
The self-employed individual who is not an owner-employee is in an
unusual position. For purposes of determining the contribution made on
his behalf he is considered an employee, with the more liberal employee
rules applying.2 0 As to the amount he may deduct for the contribution
made on his behalf, however, he is treated as an owner-employee.
If regular employees are covered under the plan, the contributions for
owner-employees may not be more favorable than those made for the
regular employees. Such discrimination will result in disqualification of the
plan.26 ' Likewise, a plan is disqualified if it permits "excess contributions
'26 2
to be made by or for an owner-employee. If only owner-employees are
covered, an "excess contribution" simply means any contribution over
10% of earned income or $2,500, whichever is less.263 If regular employees
and self-employed persons not owner-employees are also covered, the term
means: (1) any amount contributed by the employer for an owner-employee
in excess of the amount deductible; 264 (2) a contribution made by an
owner-employee as an employee in excess of the rate permitted regular em-
ployees; 2 2 (3) any amount contributed by an owner-employee as an em-
ployee in excess of the lesser of the 10% of earned income or $2,500 limita-
tion;2 6 or (4) contributions by an owner-employee as an employee under
two or more plans in excess of an aggregate amount of $2,500.267
In computing the allowable contributions which may be made for
regular employees covered by the plan, the former more liberal rules apply
and there is no dollar limit applicable.268 If discrimination in favor of such
employees should occur as a result of a higher percentage of their salary
259. I.R.C., § 401(e) (3).
260. I.R.C., § 404(e)(1) applies only to owner-employees as defined in
§ 401(c) (3).
261. I.R.C., §§ 401(e)(1), (2) (A).
262. I.R.C., § 401(e).
263. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1) (A).
264. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1) (B) (i).
265. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1) (B) (ii).
266. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1) (B) (iii).
267. I.R.C., § 401(e) (1) (B) (iv).
268. I.R.C., § 404(a).
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being contributed than for the owner-employee, the plan is not disqualified,
no penalties attach, and no contributions and attributable income have to
be repaid. An important provision is that all amounts credited for the bene-
fit of regular employees must be non-forfeitable at the time of the contribu-
tion if an owner-employee is covered by the plan.26
9
If regular employees are covered by a plan including an owner-em-
ployee, the plan may require or permit additional contributions to be made
by all those covered. These contributions may be made up to limits of
10%o of salary by regular employees and 10% of earned income or
$2,500, whichever is less, by owner-employees.270 Contributions by owner-
employees, however, must not be made at a rate which exceeds the
permitted rate for the regular employees under the plan.271 Self-contribu-
tions must be made from taxable income for both regular employees and
owner-employees; no deduction is allowed for any such contributions,
whether voluntary or compulsory under the plan. Even without a deduc-
tion, however, the advantage of additional contributions is apparent-the
accumulated income from the contributions is tax-free in the hands of the
fund until the retirement benefits are received.2 7 2 One point to be kept in
mind is that a contribution for an owner-employee may be made only out
of his earned income derived from the trade or business for which the plan
was established.2 73
The penalty provisions added by H.R. 10 introduce a new concept into
this area of the law. A qualified plan covering an owner-employee may not
permit excess contributions to be made by or for such owner-employee;2
74
if such contributions are made, they must be refunded, along with any
attributable income, to the owner-employee for whom they were made,
within six months after notice of the excess contribution is mailed by the
Internal Revenue Service to the person.2 7 5 The amount refunded is includa-
ble in the owner-employee's gross income for the year in which the excess
contribution was made. If repayment is not made within the prescribed six
month period, the owner-employee must include in his gross income the
net income attributable to his interest under the plan for the taxable year
when the excess contribution became attributable to himY.2 7 This continues
269. I.R.C., § 401(d) (2) (A).
270. I.R.C., § 401(e)(1)(B)(iii).
271. I.R.C., § 401(e)(1)(B)(ii).
272. I.R.C., § 501(a).
273. I.R.C., § 401(d)(11).
274. I.R.C., §§ 401(e) (2) (A), (d) (8) (A).
275. I.R.C., §§ 401(e)(2)(C), (d)(8)(B).
276. I.R.C., § 401(e) (2) (B).
1963]
47
Joyner et al.: Joyner: Tax Dilemma of the Self-Employed Professional
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
until the excess contribution and the amount of net income included in the
owner-employee's gross income because of disqualification of the plan is
paid to the owner-employee.277
If the excess contribution was wilfully made, several penalties follow.
The entire interest of the owner-employee for whom the contribution was
made must be paid to him from all plans under which he is covered as an
owner-employee; 278 he is disqualified from participating in a qualified plan
for the taxable year in which the excess contribution was made and for five
taxable years following; 279 and the amounts of this forced distribution are
subject to a penalty tax as a premature distribution.20 From the language
used, there apparently is no way to escape this penalty once the determina-
tion has been made that the excess contribution was wilful.281
It takes little imagination to see that requiring all employees to be
covered by a qualified plan which includes the owner-employee adds ma-
terially to the cost of the plan to the employer. A possible way to pare
these costs is to "integrate" the plan with Social Security.28 2 The employer
may take into account the Social Security taxes he actually pays on behalf
of his employees in determining the net contributions to be made to the
plan, if he also takes into account the Social Security taxes he pays on his
own account, or would pay if covered, in determining the net contribution
to be made on his behalf. Integration of the plan is permitted only if the
net contributions on behalf of owner-employees are not more than one-third
of the net contributions to the plan as a whole.21" This provision will effec-
tively block integration of a plan covering one or more owner-employees
who earn more than the other employees as a group, which will generally
be the case with a professional man or partnership.
2. Deductions
If any regular employees are covered under a plan which also benefits
owner-employees, the total contributions made on behalf of the regular
employees are deductible in accordance with the former rules applied to
plans which exclusively benefited regular employees.2 4 Also applicable to
277. IR.C., § 401(e)(2)(D).
278. I.R.C., §§ 401(d)(8)(C), (e)(2)(E)(ii).
279. I.R.C., § 401(e)(2)(E)(iii).
280. I.R.C., § 72(m) (5) (A) (iii).
281. I.R.C., § 401(e)(2)(E)(ii): "ETjhere shall be distributed to the owner-
employee on whose behalf such excess contribution was wilfully made his entire
interest in all plans with respect to which he is an owner-employee; .
282. I.R.C., § 401(d) (6).
283. I.R.C., § 401(d) (6) (A).
284. I.R.C., § 404(a).
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such contributions are the provisions permitting carryover to future years
of contributions made in the taxable year in excess of the amount deducti-
ble.285 By way of contrast, the deduction permitted for contributions for
self-employed persons is limited to one-half of the allowable employer con-
tribution for such persons.288 Inasmuch as such contributions, as previously
indicated, are limited to the lesser of 10%o of earned income or $2,500,21t
the maximum deduction for a self-employed individual is $1,250 per tax
year. Further, the regular employees' carryover provisions are expressly
stated to be inapplicable to contributions for the self-employed.2 8 The
special exception permitting larger contributions to be invested in certain
insurance contracts under special conditions289 does not change the limit
on the amount of contribution deductible. 290 Finally, in computing the de-
duction for self-employed persons, amounts spent on current insurance pro-
tection are also disregarded, 2 1 as they are in computing the contributions
for an owner-employee. 292
F. Distributions
One purpose in setting up a qualified plan for the benefit of a self-
employed person is to provide a fund which can be drawn upon by that
person when he retires. As might have been anticipated, the provisions of
H.R. 10 tightly control distributions to an owner-employee. An owner-
employee may not receive any distribution from a qualified plan prior to
attaining age 592, unless he is permanently disabled,2 93 without subjecting
himself to all the problems of the penalty for premature distributions. 25 '
If the owner-employee dies before all of his interest has been distributed to
him, his remaining interest must, with certain limited exceptions, be
distributed within five years or used immediately to purchase an annuity
for his beneficiaries.2 95 All of the owner-employee's interest must be
distributed to him prior to his attaining age 7032, 298 or distributed in
accordance with Treasury Regulations (yet to be announced) over the life
285. I.R.C., § 404(a) (1) (D), (a) (3) (A).
286. I.R.C., § 404(a)(10).
287. I.R.C., § 404(e) (1).
288. I.R.C., § 404(a) (9) (B).
289. I.R.C., § 401(e) (3).
290. I.R.C., § 404(e) (1).
291. I.R.C., § 404(a) (10).
292. I.R.C., § 404(e) (3).
293. I.R.C., § 401(d) (4) (B).
294. I.R.C., § 72(m) (5).
295. LR.C., § 401(d) (7).
296. I.R.C., § 401(a) (9) (A).
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expectancy of the owner-employee or the owner-employee and his spouse.2 9 7
The self-employed person who is not an owner-employee is treated as a
regular employee for determining the age at which he may receive distribu-
tions. There is no express restriction on the minimum age for a regular
employee to receive benefits, but under present corporate plans benefits are
commonly payable upon discharge or resignation at any age. Benefits for
regular employees under a plan benefiting self-employed persons or the
self-employed who is not an owner-employee must begin at age 702 or at
retirement if subsequent to age 70 .298
One potential problem that may arise in the administration of a quali-
fied plan is the case of a professional man who joins a partnership as a
regular employee, but after a few years becomes a self-employed partner
not an owner-employee, and still later becomes a partner owning 107 or
more of the capital or profits of the firm-an owner-employee. It is not
clear at present just how the contributions made at the various stages in
his career should be treated upon his retirement. For example, will the
contributions made for him while a regular employee and the income
attributable thereto be accorded the same treatment upon distribution as
it would if he had remained a regular employee until his retirement?
If the self-employed person takes a lump-sum distribution in liquida-
tion of his interest, he is denied the benefit of capital gains treatment which
is accorded the regular employee.299 Instead, there is a new averaging device
available for the receipt of such distributions by the self-employed, limiting
the tax to five times the increase in tax which results from including 207
of the "includible portion" of the distribution in gross income for the taxa-
ble year.30 In computing the "includible portion" of any distribution, the
amount contributed to the plan by the self-employed person as an em-
ployee from after tax dollars is excluded. Periodic distributions made to
any self-employed individual from a qualified plan are taxed at ordinary
rates to the extent that the payments are not a return of the taxpayer's
investment.Ao'
Several other benefits enjoyed by regular employees are expressly
denied to self-employed persons. The $5,000 death benefit exclusion available
to the beneficiary or estate of an employee 3 2 is denied the self-employed. 313
297. I.R.C., § 401(a) (9) (B).
298. I.R.C., § 401(a) (9) (A).
299. I.R.C., § 402(a) (2).
300. I.R.C., § 72(n)(2).
301. I.R.C., § 72(a)(b).
302. I.R.C., § 101(b) (1).
303. I.R.C., § 101(b) (3).
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Likewise, the sick pay exclusion8°4 for disability payments, the gift tax ex-
clusion in designating a beneficiary,30 5 and the estate tax exclusion for pay-
ments made to a beneficiary from a qualified plan upon the death of a
regular employee 30 6 are made inapplicable to the self-employed by the
provisions of H.R. 10.307 The retirement income credit, however, has been
extended to cover self-employed as well as regular employees receiving
distributions from qualified plans.308
A premature distributions °9 from a qualified plan to an owner-employee
results in the imposition of a tax penalty.310 There is no comparable pro-
vision applicable to distributions to regular employees under a qualified plan.
If a distribution is made to an owner-employee before age 592 or permanent
disability prior to that age, the amount of the penalty imposed depends
upon the size of the -distribution. If the amount received equals or exceeds
$2,500, the tax is 110% of the increase in taxes that would have resulted
if such amount had been included ratably over the taxable year and the
four immediately preceding tax years.3 1 If the distribution is less than
$2,500, the tax is 110% of the increase in tax which results from including
the distribution in gross income for the taxable year in which the distribu-
tion was received.3 1 2 As a further restriction upon any premature distribu-
tion, the taxable income is treated as not being less than the excess of the
amount received over the number of personal exemptions to which the
taxpayer is entitled in that taxable year.313
The scope of the penalty provisions on premature distributions includes
not only outright payments to the owner-employee, but also loans against
an annuity or life insurance contract31 4 and assignments or pledges of any
part of the owner-employee's interest in the plan. 3' 5 As an additional pen-
alty, the employer may not make further contributions to a qualified plan
for any owner-employee for five taxable years after the year in which he
receives a premature distribution.16
304. I.R.C., § 105(g).
305. I.R.C., § 2517(b).
306. I.R.C., § 2039(c).
307. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 26 (1961).
308. I.R.C., § 37(c).
309. I.R.C., § 401(d) (4) (B).
310. I.R.C., § 72(m) (5).
311. I.R.C., § 72(m) (5) (B).
312. I.R.C., § 72(m) (5) (C).
313. I.R.C., § 72(n)(3).
314. I.R.C., § 72(m) (4) (B).
315. I.R.C., § 72 (m) (4) (A).
316. I.R.C., § 401(d)(5)(C).
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G. Summary
It is readily apparent that the enactment of H.R. 10 has not removed
the discrimination against the self-employed in regard to the establishment
of qualified retirement plans; it has only decreased the discrimination.
The limit on contributions for the benefit of owner-employees and the
deduction permitted therefor by the employer clearly show that the self-
employed have not attained equal status with shareholder-employees under
a qualified corporate plan. Particularly in the case of a self-employed
individual engaged in a trade or business where capital is a material income
producing factor,817 the individual desiring to establish a qualified retire-
ment plan should seriously consider incorporation of his business and es-
tablishment of a qualified plan for regular employees (including shareholder-
employees). Under a plan covering corporate shareholder-employees, the
arbitrary 30% limitation on earned income is not applicable,' 81 and the
contributions on behalf of the owner as a stockholder-employee would ordi-
narily be substantially more than the amount permitted for an owner-
employee.
Likewise, in the case of a partnership of professional men, the contribu-
tions and deductions permitted them under a qualified plan as owner-
employees will probably be less than the contributions and deductions
allowed them as employees of a professional association, assuming that such
an association will be accorded the advantages presently enjoyed by quali-
fied employees' plans. Also to be noted are the more liberal standards allowed
an employees' plan regarding coverage and vesting of contributions.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the enactment of H. R. 10, the self-employed indi-
vidual remains at a severe disadvantage as concerns deferred compensation.
This is particularly true of the self-employed professional, for in many
states the incorporation solution is still a vision for the future as to such
persons. Furthermore, even in those states where statute or court rule
permits professional incorporation, the problematical validity of such
statutes and rules for federal tax purposes, not to mention the numerous
tax difficulties encountered even if the desired corporate status is attained,
makes the usefulness of such an approach questionable. Perhaps thoughtful
317. I.R.C., § 401(c)(2)(B).
318. I.R.C., § 404(a).
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drafting could eliminate some of the problems, but an approach which so
deviates from long-established patterns will always encounter difficulties.
It seems rather obvious that the preferred solution lies in the area
of direct Congressional action. It is unfortunate in this respect that H. R. 10
has accomplished so little; it is hardly likely that a great many self-employed
professionals will find it of much use. The Congressional position, however,
is understandable. The revenue loss to the Treasury was seriously con-
sidered by both houses of Congress.3' 9 If the self-employed group had been
granted completely equal treatment, the revenue loss would indeed have
been substantial. Insuring fairness in and the policing of myriads of small
private plans was undoubtedly another key consideration.
Hopefully, however, the race is not yet completely run. The Senate
minority report by Senators Douglas and Gore faces the fact that H. R.
10 is in all probability but a first step in the direction of tax equality for
the self-employed.32° In future years the self-employed will undoubtedly
strive to liberalize the benefits of H. R. 10. It is quite possible that such
attempts will prove successful.
Until such time as Congress sees fit to act further on the matter, many
if not most self-employed professionals will probably continue as before.
There will undoubtedly be an increase in legislation allowing professional
incorporation, but it remains to be seen whether this will prove a completely
feasible route. If the strict requirements of the "Kintner" Regulations are
modified, the efficacy of the professional corporation or association may
yet be established. But in view of the fact that the possibility of further
Congressional action is probably more than mere wishful thinking, many
professional partnerships and groups may prefer to delay action until the
end result becomes clear.
319. S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1961); H.R. No. 378, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961). For a background of Congressional thought on the mat-
ter, see Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short His-
tory of the Jenkins-Keoght Bill, 14 TAx L. REv. 55 (1958).
320. S. REP. No. 992,'87th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1961).
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